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Abstract
Over the past few years, research has focused on the use of a computational method
known as dynamic programming for producing an optimized decision logic for airborne
collision avoidance. There have been a series of technical reports, conference papers,
and journal articles summarizing the research, but they have primarily investigated
two-aircraft encounters with only one aircraft equipped with a collision avoidance
system.
This thesis looks at recent research on coordination, interoperability, and multiple-
threat encounters. In situations where an aircraft encounters another aircraft with
a collision avoidance system, it is important that the resolution advisories provided
to the pilots be coordinated so that both aircraft are not instructed to maneuver
in the same direction. Interoperability is a related consideration since new collision
avoidance systems will be occupying the same airspace as legacy systems. Resolv-
ing encounters with multiple intruders poses computational challenges that will be
addressed in this thesis.
The methodology presented in this thesis results in logic that is safer and performs
better than the legacy Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). To assess
the performance of the system, this thesis uses U.S. airspace encounter models. The
results indicate that the proposed methodology can bring significant benefit to the
current airspace and can support the need for safe, non-disruptive collision protection
as the airspace continues to evolve.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), currently mandated on
all large transport and cargo aircraft, has been shown to significantly reduce the risk
of mid-air collision. TCAS uses an on-board surveillance system to monitor the local
air traffic. The surveillance information is then provided to the threat resolution logic
to determine whether to alert the pilot of a potential collision. TCAS will issue a
resolution advisory to the pilot to climb or descend at a particular rate to prevent a
collision.
Developing robust collision avoidance logic that reliably prevents collision without
excessive alerting is challenging due to sensor error and the uncertain future paths of
the aircraft. The current TCAS logic was the result of many years of development
and involved the careful engineering of many heuristic rules. Unfortunately, due to
the complexity of the logic, it is difficult to revise to accommodate the evolution of
the airspace and the introduction of new surveillance technologies and procedures.
Over the past few years, research has focused on the use of a computational
method known as dynamic programming for producing an optimized decision logic
for airborne collision avoidance. This research has resulted in the establishment of
the Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) program and is being targeted
at becoming the next international standard for collision avoidance for both manned
and unmanned aircraft. Research up to this point has primarily focused on scenarios
with a single unequipped intruder.
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This thesis focuses on recent research on coordination, interoperability, and mul-
tiple threat (multithreat) encounters. In situations where an aircraft encounters an-
other aircraft with a collision avoidance system, it is important that the resolution
advisories provided to the pilots be coordinated so that both aircraft are not instructed
to maneuver in the same direction. Interoperability is a related consideration since
new collision avoidance systems will be occupying the same airspace as legacy systems.
Resolving encounters with multiple intruders will become increasingly important as
the airspace becomes more dense, but poses some computational challenges.
The collision avoidance problem in this thesis is constrained to last minute collision
avoidance. ACAS X for coordinated encounters must use the existing communication
architecture and advisory sets used by TCAS. Therefore, there is limited commu-
nication between aircraft and the collision avoidance system can only issue vertical
resolution advisories.
The contributions of this thesis can be separated in two categories–coordination
and multithreat.
• Coordination. A comprehensive evaluation of various coordination methods for
ACAS X is performed for two aircraft scenarios. The methods are discussed
in terms of computational complexity, collision avoidance performance, and
robustness to non-compliance.
• Multithreat. A simple, yet effective, extension of ACAS X to multiple intruders
is presented. The performance of the method is compared against TCAS in
simulations of realistic encounters and stressful scenarios. The computational
complexity is also discussed.
1.1 Simulation Overview
In order to evaluate the success of the various concepts proposed in this thesis, sim-
ulations were conducted which attempted to model real encounters as accurately as
possible. Encounters were developed using a high fidelity encounter model. The
18
aircraft were simulated based on approximate aircraft dynamics. Unless otherwise
stated, the pilot response to an advisory was modeled as a 1/4 g acceleration applied
5 s after the advisory until the minimum commanded vertical rate is achieved. Subse-
quent advisories are modeled with a 1/3 g acceleration applied 3 s after the advisory is
issued [1]. The on-board surveillance sensors used were based on the standard TCAS
sensors currently used on TCAS equipped aircraft [2]. Sensor models are discussed
in Section 3.4.
1.1.1 Encounter Sets
Multiple encounter sets were constructed from a dynamic Bayesian network generated
from collected radar data [3]. All equipped aircraft in the encounters were required
to be “discrete-code” aircraft and have a minimum airspeed of 100 kt. There were no
restrictions on tracks for unequipped aircraft. The multithreat encounter sets were
generated from a similar model [4].
The simulations were conducted with aircraft that are either equipped or un-
equipped. Equipped aircraft were simulated with a variation of ACAS X or TCAS.
Unequipped aircraft were simulated with no collision avoidance system and were ei-
ther Mode S or Mode C aircraft. Mode S aircraft generally broadcast their altitude
with 25 ft quantization while Mode C aircraft broadcast their altitude with 100 ft
quantization. For this thesis, every equipped and Mode S aircraft are assumed to use
25 ft quantization. Each aircraft in the simulations was assigned a unique Mode S
address. The first aircraft in the encounter was always assigned the lower address.
The coordination scheme used by TCAS and some proposed schemes for ACAS
X use Mode S addresses. Therefore, the encounter sets created were permuted to
ensure no biasing for position of higher Mode S aircraft. For example, if there was
an equipped vs. equipped encounter, then it would appear twice in the set. The first
time the encounter would be unchanged and the second time the tracks exchanged.
Importance sampling was used when generating the encounter sets. Proposal
distributions for horizontal and vertical miss distances were created that resulted in
acceptable variance of the metric estimates with reasonably sized encounter sets.
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The encounter sets used were the following:
• Equipped vs. Equipped: 1.33× 106 encounters,
• Equipped vs. Unequipped: 1.59× 106 encounters,
• Equipped vs. Equipped vs. Equipped: 1.39× 106 encounters,
• Equipped vs. Equipped vs. Unequipped: 1.77× 106 encounters, and
• Equipped vs. Unequipped vs. Unequipped: 2.29× 106 encounters.
1.1.2 Metrics
The performance of a collision avoidance system (CAS) can be separated into safety
performance and operational performance. The primary objective of a collision avoid-
ance system is to increase safety. However, a collision avoidance system should not
interfere with normal, safe flight operations. Excessive alerts and changes in the
advisories affect the efficiency of a collision avoidance system. The metrics used to
evaluate collision avoidance systems in this report include:
• Near Mid-Air Collision. A near mid-air collision (NMAC) occurs when two
aircraft come within 500 ft horizontally and 100 ft vertically. NMACs can be
broken into two categories: induced and unresolved. An induced NMAC is
an NMAC that occurs with a CAS but does not occur without a CAS. An
unresolved NMAC is an NMAC that occurs both with and without a CAS.
• Risk Ratio. The risk ratio is defined as the probability of an NMAC given the
aircraft is equipped with a CAS divided by the probability of an NMAC given
no aircraft is equipped:
Risk Ratio = Pr(NMAC | aircraft with CAS)Pr(NMAC | aircraft without CAS) . (1.1)
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• Induced Risk Ratio. The induced risk ratio (induced RR) is calculated by divid-
ing the probability of an induced NMAC by the probability of NMAC without
a collision avoidance system:
Induced RR = Pr(Induced NMAC)Pr(NMAC without a CAS) . (1.2)
• Alert. An alert is defined as when a CAS issues an advisory during an encounter.
• Strengthening. A strengthening is any change in a commanded vertical rate to
a greater vertical rate in the same direction of the previous advisory.
• Reversal. A reversal is any advisory that changes the sense of a previous advi-
sory (e.g., climb to descend).
• Restart. A restart is when a CAS terminates an advisory and then issues a new
advisory within 20 s.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 summarizes the major approaches to collision avoidance and in particular,
coordinated aircraft collision avoidance. An overview of Markov decision processes
(MDPs) and partially observable Markov decision processes is provided.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of ACAS X. The model used for ACAS X along
with the optimization processes is discussed. Chapter 3 concludes with example
policies and an encounter for ACAS X and an unequipped Mode S aircraft.
Chapter 4 discusses multiple methodologies to extend ACAS X to handle en-
counters with a single intruder equipped with a collision avoidance system (CAS). A
scheme similar to TCAS, called forced cooperation, is explored in detail. Simulation
results are presented where each aircraft is equipped with ACAS X and encounters
where the intruder is equipped with TCAS. The robustness of different coordination
approaches to delayed pilot responses and non-compliant intruders is analyzed.
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Chapter 5 generalizes ACAS X to handle encounters with multiple intruders. Two
variations of a cost fusion approach is explored. Simulation results are presented for
various equipage scenarios and a stress testing analysis is performed.
Chapter 6 concludes the report and outlines directions for future work.
22
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides a summary of the major approaches to collision avoidance and
coordination. To develop a basis for the understanding and extension of ACAS X, a
review of Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable Markov decision
processes (POMDPs) is presented. Finally, we will discuss variations of MDPs and
POMDPs for multiple agents.
2.1 Previous Work
Collision avoidance appears in a plethora of fields due to its importance in motion
planning. As a result, collision avoidance techniques have been widely researched.
In 2000, Kuchar and Yang produced a survey of over 60 different methods that have
been proposed to address conflict detection and resolution and many more important
approaches have been published since [5]. This section will summarize the major
approaches that appear in the air traffic domain.
2.1.1 Potential Field Methods
The idea behind potential field methods can be found in the air traffic domain in
1969 and the methods have been a popular approach to collision avoidance since
their introduction [6]–[8]. The problem is generally modeled as virtual forces acting
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on the aircraft. Waypoints or goal locations act as attractive forces, while other
aircraft and other obstacles act as repelling forces. This approach is very simple, easy
to understand and implement, and scales well computationally to many aircraft, but
it has some disadvantages [9]. One problem is that potential field methods are prone
to local minima. An example is when agents get “stuck” due to the canceling out of
forces.
Most of the work with potential fields in the air traffic domain does not account for
uncertainty in control or observation [10]–[12]. Despite not considering uncertainty
in observations or control, Kelly and Eby showed that potential field methods may
be used to resolve complex, random, multi-aircraft conflicts without the use of intent
information [13]. Prandini et al. took a potential field approach and generalized the
idea to work for probabilistic dynamic environments [14].
2.1.2 Geometric Optimization
This category of collision avoidance technique utilizes the geometric characteristics
of the environment and agents involved (i.e. aircraft trajectories). Often a closed-
form analytical solution for minimal changes in the velocity vector are obtained.
Bilimoria introduced a 2-D conflict resolution algorithm given only current positions
and velocity vectors of aircraft [15]. The resolutions are combinations of heading
or speed changes and are generated from a closed-form analytic solution. Multiple
aircraft encounters are handled in a pair-wise “most immediate” conflict ordering.
KB3D is a 3-D extension of this algorithm where a cylinder defines the protected
zones of intruders [16]. Additional modifications to KB3D only requires one aircraft
to maneuver for successful collision avoidance, and implicit coordination is guaranteed
with perfect state information [17].
Luongo et al. developed an analytical solution based on a cylindrical safety area
surrounding the aircraft that minimizes the aircraft’s deviation from the nominal tra-
jectory [18]. The algorithm was developed for non-cooperative aircraft and multiple
aircraft encounters are handled in a pair-wise fashion. The authors perform numer-
ical simulations taking into account aircraft dynamics and on-board noisy sensors.
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To account for the unmodeled uncertainty, the protected zone was increased prior
to simulation to a static size. However, realistic navigation sensor errors led to a
deterioration of the proposed collision avoidance algorithm [18].
Chamlou developed a model-based geometric approach that did not require a
fixed look-ahead time to predict a loss of separation [19]. With this approach the
protected zone around the aircraft could be varied real-time to account for uncer-
tainties. Provided no state uncertainty, independent implicitly coordinated solutions
were guaranteed.
Geometric approaches provide very fast analytic solutions that can be easily im-
plemented real-time. However, all of the geometric approaches discussed rely on a
linear propagation of the state vector and do not consider state uncertainty in the
algorithm. For last minute collision avoidance, the protected zone surrounding the
aircraft would have to be superficially enlarged to ensure system robustness which
might lead to unnecessary alerts and degrading operational performance.
2.1.3 Mathematical Programming
Mathematical programming has gained popularity since the Kuchar and Yang survey
was published as the computational power available to agents has increased. Frazzoli
et al. proposed a semidefinite programming approach that resulted in centralized
conflict resolution while minimizing deviations from a desired path [20]. The proposed
approach does not account for state uncertainty and relies on a centralized planning
algorithm in which the desired headings of the aircraft are shared.
Using models where the agents’ dynamics can be approximated using only linear
constraints enables the use of mixed integer linear programming (MILP) [21], [22].
Schouwenaars et al. use a MILP approach to develop a decentralized planning struc-
ture in which each aircraft updates its trajectory one at a time [23]. The authors
were able to guarantee safety by developing a safe “loiter pattern” that the aircraft
would default to if a safe trajectory could not be found. Other MILP approaches have
been introduced that also claim real-time implementation from fast solutions using
commercial software [24], [25].
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Oishi et al. proposes the use of a mixed integer nonlinear program [26]. The
authors focus on guaranteeing safety while meeting certain performance criteria. The
optimization assumes cooperative aircraft and the solvers used were very sensitive to
the initial values of the state and control trajectories. Christodoulou and Kontoge-
orgou used nonlinear programming (NLP) to solve for minimum velocity changes to
avoid conflicts and then attempted to create a neural network that can predict the
velocity changes [27]. Borrelli et al. compare a nonlinear programming approach
using an interior point algorithm to a MILP approach [28]. The authors determined
that the MILP was always faster then the NLP and as the problem size grew, the
gap between the MILP solution time and the NLP solution time increased. They also
determined that the MILP and the NLP always provide similar results in terms of
performance.
The mathematical programming methods mentioned thus far do not factor in un-
certainty of dynamics or sensor measurements. The Robust Safe but Knowledgeable
(RSBK) algorithm is a MILP planning algorithm which uses robust model predictive
control, which is robust to external disturbances and modeling errors [29]. RSBK
solves a centralized problem when it is applied to multiple agents. Luders developed
Efficient RSBK which is a MILP formulation with non-uniform time steps between
target waypoints, and plans a detailed short-term trajectory and a coarse long-term
trajectory [30]. A decentralized version of RSBK was developed in which each vehi-
cle only computes its own trajectory, which is obtained by solving a sub-problem of
reduced size [31]. The drawback of the RSBK family is the requirement of sharing
plans. That is, when an agent is solving for its trajectory, it requires the plans (e.g.
waypoints) of the agents in its neighborhood. To apply this idea to last minute air-
craft collision avoidance, unequipped intruders would have to be modeled as obstacles
or the plans of the intruders would have to be extrapolated from the current state
information.
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2.1.4 MDP/POMDP Approaches
Most of the methods previously discussed are some form of open-loop planning. Of-
ten, new plans are regenerated as new observations are made and this is called open-
loop feedback control. Closed-loop planning computes a strategy for selecting actions
from a given state and accounts for selecting future actions based on new informa-
tion using a probabilistic model. Chryssanthacopoulos and Kochenderfer demonstrate
some performance gains when using closed-loop planning strategies in highly stochas-
tic environments [32]. Recent work on collision avoidance algorithms in closed-loop
planning strategies are based on solutions to Markov decision processes (MDPs).
Winder formed the aircraft collision avoidance problem as an MDP with simple
dynamics where he assumed Gaussian intruder process noise [33]. The MDP approach
assumed that all necessary state variables were known at all times. Winder extends
the problem and used a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) for-
mulation where the aircraft is in an uncertain mode. The modes correspond to dif-
ferent aircraft dynamics (e.g. level-off mode and a descent mode). The POMDP
formulation demonstrated that using this approach, safety can be maintained or im-
proved with a reduction in unnecessary alerts when compared to other methods.
Kaelbling and Lozano-Pérez assume highly accurate state measurements and un-
certainty in the pilot response to advisories. Under these assumptions, they model
the aircraft collision avoidance problem as an MDP [34]. The authors investigate con-
trol policies derived using a policy gradient method and a policy search by dynamic
programming approach. These methods avoid having to discretize the state space
and thus have a weaker dependence on the size of the state space.
Wolf and Kochenderfer use an online POMDP approach to collision avoidance
using a Monte Carlo real-time belief space search [35]. Their approach assumed
noisy sensors that provided aircraft position, orientation, rates, and accelerations
from both the own aircraft and the intruder. The formulation uses a finite action
space, continuous state and observation spaces, and use sample-based representations
of state uncertainty.
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Temizer et al. model the aircraft collision avoidance problem as a POMDP and
investigate the use of difference sensors while solving the problem oﬄine [36]. The
authors use discretized state, action, and observation spaces. They showed that the
POMDP approach can work for various sensors including TCAS-like sensors where
bearing, range, and altitude of the intruder are measured as well as limited field-
of-view sensors where elevation of the intruder is measured with respect to the own
aircraft instead of altitude. Near-optimal policies were computed using a solver that
uses Successive Approximations of the Reachable Space under Optimal Policies (SAR-
SOP) algorithm [37]. The approach only considered a single unequipped intruder and
the state spaces were highly discretized. With approximately 3400 states, the SAR-
SOP solver was able to generate policies in 3 to 5 hours.
Kochenderfer et al. also formed the collision avoidance problem as a POMDP and
showed the formulation to be robust to modeling errors [38]–[42]. The problem allows
for the maneuvers in the vertical plane while still accounting for stochastic horizontal
aircraft dynamics. This method was shown to be viable for multiple intruders and
for coordinated encounters [42]. This thesis extends this approach to improve the
handling of coordinated encounters and multiple equipped and unequipped intruders.
More detail on this POMDP formulation will be provided in Chapter 3.
2.1.5 Other Approaches
Other approaches to collision avoidance have been proposed. TCAS uses linear prop-
agation and complex heuristic rules to determine proper resolutions [43]. Gariel et al.
propose a conflict detection algorithm that uses trajectory prediction different from
the linear velocity propagation that is currently used by TCAS [44]. Their approach
relies on constant turn rate propagation. The authors include two protected areas–
one that is fixed during simulation and can be inflated to account for errors in state
estimates, and a second zone that varies during simulation based on the closure rate
between aircraft.
Velocity obstacle (VO) methods are a geometric approach that rely on velocity
information to determine a collision avoidance maneuver [45]. A VO is the set of
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velocities for an agent that would result in a collision with another object assuming the
other object maintains its current velocity. A collision avoidance maneuver is selected
from the intersection of the reachable set of velocities based on dynamic and kinematic
constraints and the complement of the VO. The original approach is based on a linear
approximation of the obstacle’s trajectory and does not consider uncertainty [45].
Shiller et al. extended the approach to incorporate known trajectories and obstacles
with non-linear velocities [46]. Kluge and Prassler developed probabilistic VOs by
considering uncertainty in the shape and velocity of the objects [47]. A probabilistic
VO maps the velocities of an agent to the probability of colliding with an object. With
probabilistic VOs, selecting an appropriate collision avoidance maneuver requires a
utility function which considers whether the velocity is reachable, the probability of
collision, and some desired goals [47]. Berg et al. extended the basic VO approach
to multiple agent systems [48]. The extension to multiple agents assumes that other
agents make collision avoidance decisions similarly. The basic idea is for the two
agents to share the burden of a collision avoidance maneuver by choosing a velocity
that is a convex combination of the agent’s current velocity and a desired velocity
(i.e., a velocity that is reachable and outside of the VO) [48].
Viebahn and Schiefele developed a conflict detection algorithm that discretizes
the state space and derives a threat probability for each element in the space [49].
The position of the own aircraft is also represented using a probability distribution.
A conflict is determined when the joint probability is higher than some threshold.
Prandini et al. also develop a conflict detection algorithm that factors in uncertainty
[50]. The authors use probabilistic models for the aircraft dynamics and use random-
ized algorithms to overcome the computational burden of solving for the probability
of conflict.
Kantas et al. constructed a simulation based Bayesian approach to determine op-
timal trajectories in the presence of wind disturbances [51]. The approach attempts to
minimize the expected time of arrival for all aircraft by determining optimal maneu-
vers using sequential Monte Carlo sampling. The planning is handled in a centralized
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fashion and the authors suggest that short execution times are attainable when the
algorithms are parallelised and implemented on graphics processor units.
An algorithm developed by Hoffmann and Tomlin uses a rule-based approach
derived using optimal control and reachability analysis [52]. The algorithm is decen-
tralized and very fast with a large number of vehicles. However, it requires aircraft
to share state information and does not factor in uncertainty.
Two cooperative conflict resolution algorithms are presented by Šišlák et al. [53],
[54]. One algorithm is an iterative approach that resolves conflicts by pairwise nego-
tiations and the second resolves the conflicts based on multi-party negotiation. Both
approaches are decentralized, rely on shared partial flight plans, work with imprecise
flight plan execution, and provide maneuvers based on variations to the initial flight
path.
Goode and Roan present a collision avoidance strategy using a differential game
theoretic approach [55]. The agent decides on an action assuming a worse-case sce-
nario. The assumption of an intruder acting as a pursuer provides robustness to
the control; however, that assumption can result in a conservative strategy (i.e. many
false alerts in the air traffic domain). Another game theoretic approach was developed
by Archibald et al. The authors developed a decentralized and cooperative algorithm
based on satisficing game theory [56]. The idea is that satisficing agents are able
to condition their own preferences on the preferences of others, allowing agents to
compromise in order to achieve both individual and group goals.
2.2 Review of MDPs and POMDPs
As discussed in Section 2.1.4, collision avoidance problems can be modeled as a
Markov decision process. When there is uncertainty in the agent’s state, the prob-
lem is more appropriately modeled as a partially observable Markov decision process.
This section discusses the general framework for MDPs and POMDPs.
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2.2.1 MDP
An MDP is a general framework for sequential decision making in stochastic envi-
ronments when the state of the system is fully observable. The process satisfies the
Markov property. That is, the conditional probability distribution of future states
only depends on the present state and action taken. An MDP is defined by the tuple
〈S,A, T,R〉, where S is a finite set of states, A is a set of all possible actions the
agent may take, T is a transition probability function, and R is an immediate reward
function. T is often called the state-transition function. The probability of a state
transitioning from s to s′ by action a is denoted T (s, a, s′). The reward function, R,
dictates the immediate reward received for taking action a in state s and is denoted
R(s, a).
Solving an MDP involves searching for a policy that maximizes the expected sum
of the instantaneous reward. An MDP policy is a strategy for selecting actions and
maps states to an action. Under certain assumptions regarding the structure of the
reward function, it is sufficient to only consider policies that deterministically depend
only on the current state without losing optimality [57]. Given a policy pi, the action
to execute from state s is denoted pi(s). The expected value of executing policy pi
from state s is denoted V pi(s). An optimal policy, pi∗(s) is a policy that maximizes
the expected value
pi∗(s) = arg max
pi
V pi(s),∀s ∈ S. (2.1)
Dynamic programming (DP) may be used to compute the value of policy pi for a
finite number of steps [57]. For the first step, the value is the expected reward of step
one, V pi1 (s) = R(s, pi(s)). If we know the value of executing the policy pi for the first
N − 1 steps, then we can compute the the value at step N as
V piN (s) = R(s, pi(s)) +
∑
s′
T (s, pi(s), s′)V piN−1(s′). (2.2)
The most common dynamic programming algorithms used to compute optimal poli-
cies are policy iteration and value iteration.
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Policy iteration is done in two steps starting with any policy:
• Policy evaluation. Given policy pin, compute V pin .
• Policy improvement. Improve the policy pin to get a new policy pin+1.
This process continues until there is no more improvements to be made (i.e. pin =
pin+1). Algorithm 1 is an outline of policy iteration [57].
Algorithm 1 Policy Iteration
1: function PolicyIteration(pi0)
2: n← 0
3: repeat
4: Calculate V pin
5: for s ∈ S do
6: pin+1(s)← arg maxa {R(s, a) +
∑
s′ T (s, a, s′)V pin(s′)}
7: n← n+ 1
8: until pin = pin+1
9: return V pin , pin+1
An alternate and more common method used to solve MDPs is value iteration.
The value iteration algorithm relies on the Bellman optimality equation V ∗(s) =
maxa [R(s, a) +
∑
s′ T (s, a, s′)U∗(s′)] [58]. Algorithm 2 provides an outline of value
iteration [57]. The || · || operator denotes the max norm (i.e. ||V || = maxs|V (s)|) and
 is a predefined tolerance threshold. The stopping criteria presented in Algorithm 2
is just one of several that can be considered.
Algorithm 2 Value Iteration
1: function ValueIteration
2: n← 0
3: Vn(s)← 0,∀s ∈ S
4: repeat
5: for s ∈ S do
6: Vn+1(s)← maxa {R(s, a) +∑s′ T (s, a, s′)Vn(s′)}
7: n← n+ 1
8: until ||Vn+1 − Vn|| < 
9: for s ∈ S do
10: pi(s)← arg maxa {R(s, a) +
∑
s′ T (s, a, s′)Vn(s′)}
11: return Vn, pi
32
One benefit of value iteration is that the state-action values are calculated for
each state. It is often beneficial to store these values when using approximate DP
for continuous state spaces. There are variations on the algorithms presented that
result in less computational complexity, but the concept is the same. The formulation
presented assumes that there is not a discount factor at each time step. The addition
of this parameter is straightforward and does not add any complexity.
2.2.2 POMDP
MDPs require full knowledge of the current state. Often this assumption is not valid
in real world problems. POMDPs provide a general framework that factors in the
uncertainty of the state. A POMDP is an MDP in which the real state is unknown,
but the agent is able to make partial observations of the true system state [57]. A
POMDP is defined by the tuple 〈S,A,Ω, T, O,R〉, where S,A, T, and R are the same
as the MDP. Ω is a set of possible observations the agent can receive. O is the
observation function that returns the probability of the agent receiving observation o
after taking action a and ending in state s′ and is denoted O(s′, a, o).
A belief state is a distribution over the state space and is a sufficient statistic for
the history of observations received [57]. A policy of a POMDP is a mapping from the
observations received to actions. It can be proven that a policy can be represented as
a mapping from belief states to actions [59]. At each step an agent chooses an action
based on the current belief state and the provided policy. The system transitions
based on the chosen action, and an observation and reward are received. The belief
state is then updated and the cycle continues. After choosing action a, transitioning
to state s′, and receiving observation o, the belief state, b is updated by
b′(s′) = P (s′|o, a, b) ∝ O(s′, a, o)∑
s
T (s, a, s′)b(s). (2.3)
A POMDP can be thought of as an MDP where the states are belief states. The
state space of this belief MDP is the set of all possible beliefs, B. The state transition
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function τ(b, a, b′) and the immediate reward R(b, a) are given by
τ(b, a, b′) =
∑
o
P (b′|b, a, o)∑
s′
O(s′, a, o)
∑
s
T (s, a, s′), and (2.4)
R(b, a) =
∑
s
b(s)R(s, a). (2.5)
Solving for an exact solution in the worst case is PSPACE-complete [57]. However,
solutions can often be approximated well. Both oﬄine and online approximations
exist.
One oﬄine approximation is called QMDP. The QMDP approach assumes all
state uncertainty disappears at the next time step. This assumption allows for the
state-action values, Q(s, a), to be calculated assuming full observability. If the current
belief state is b, then the action to be selected is given by
pi(b) = arg max
a
∑
s
b(s)Q(s, a). (2.6)
This approximation performs well in many real world scenarios when the actions do
not reduce state uncertainty. Therefore, when actions are information gathering and
can significantly reduce the state uncertainty, the QMDP is a poor approximation
[60], [61].
Other oﬄine approximations include the fast informed bound method [61], point-
based value iteration (PBVI) [62], Heuristic Search Value Iteration (HSVI) [63], and
Successive Approximations of the Reachable Space under Optimal Policies (SARSOP)
[37], and randomized point-based value iteration algorithm [64].
Online methods are popular for high dimensional problems. One method uses
an approximate value function computed oﬄine and performs a one-step lookahead
online to improve upon the policy. This one-step lookahead idea can be extended to
an arbitrary depth and is called forward search. Partially Observable Monte Carlo
Planning (POMCP) is a Monte Carlo tree search algorithm for POMDPs [65]. Ross
et al. survey several online planning algorithms [66].
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2.3 Expanding MDPs and POMDPs to Multiple
Agents
MDPs and POMDPs are great methods for determining actions for a single agent in
stochastic environments. These methods can be extended to cooperative multiagent
domains as well. This section discusses the extension of both MDPs and POMDPs to
cooperative multiagent domains. In particular the framework for multiagent Markov
decision processes (MMDP), decentralized Markov decision processes (Dec-MDP),
and decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (Dec-POMDP) will
be discussed.
2.3.1 MMDP
MMDPs extend MDPs and allow for sequential decision making in a cooperative
multiagent system. Since the agents are cooperative, there is a single reward function
that the agents must maximize [57]. An MMDP can be viewed as a large MDP. An
MMDP can be defined by the tuple 〈S,A, T,R〉, where S is a finite set of states, A
is a set actions, T is a transition probability function, and R is an immediate reward
function. Since more than one agent is considered, the action space is made up of
joint actions. That is, each element of A represents an action for each agent. Then
T (s, a, s′) is the transition function which gives the probability of transitioning to
state s′ from state s when the agents execute the joint action a. Similarly, R(s, a) is
the immediate reward for taking joint action a in state s.
Since MMDPs can be thought of as large MDPs, the same solution approaches can
be used. Methods like policy iteration (Algorithm 1) and value iteration (Algorithm 2)
can be used to solve MMDPs.
The model of an MMDP does not consider individual observations. Therefore
each agent must have full observability of the entire system, a centralized planner is
used that has access to the system state, or the agents communicate their observations
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free and instantaneously. The last idea of communicating observations requires the
system to be jointly fully observable.
2.3.2 Dec-MDP/Dec-POMDP
The requirement of individual complete observability of the system state is often not
realistic. A decentralized control where the system is jointly fully observable can
be modeled as a Dec-MDP and modeled as a Dec-POMDP if the system is jointly
partially observable. Dec-MDPs are a special case of Dec-POMDPs where the system
state is jointly observable.
A Dec-POMDP is defined as a tuple 〈S,A,Ω, T, O,R〉, where S,A, T, and R are
the same as the MMDP. Ω is a set of joint observations the agents can receive.
O is the observation function that returns the probability of the agents receiving
observations 〈o1, . . . , on〉 after taking joint action a and ending in state s′ and is
denoted O(s′, a, 〈o1, . . . , on〉).
Solutions to Dec-MDPs and Dec-POMDPs are joint policies. A joint policy pi
for a Dec-POMDP with n agents is a set of individual policies 〈pi1, . . . , pin〉, where
pii is the individual policy for agent i. An optimal policy is one that maximizes the
expected total reward of the system [57].
Finding optimal solutions to Dec-POMDPs is difficult. The number of joint poli-
cies for a system is doubly exponential in the horizon of the problem. The problem
of finding the optimal solution for a finite horizon Dec-POMDP with more than one
agent is NEXP-complete [67]. Even finding a bounded approximation is NEXP-hard
[68]. The same complexity holds for Dec-MDPs [57]. Oliehoek provides an overview
of various approaches to find approximate solutions to Dec-POMDPs [69].
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Chapter 3
ACAS X Overview
The Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) is under development and is
intended to replace the existing Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).
To minimize the amount of retraining for aircrews, ACAS X is limited to the same
resolution advisories as TCAS. Therefore, only vertical maneuvers are considered and
ACAS X assumes that the aircraft dynamics in the horizontal plane are unaffected
by advisories.
ACAS X models the collision avoidance problem as a POMDP. An approximate
solution to the POMDP is found using the QMDP approach discussed in Section 2.2.2.
The state-action values are found using value iteration (Algorithm 2).
This chapter describes the action space, state space, the dynamic model, and how
state estimation is performed. The cost function used in the optimization and the
online costs used to improve performance are discussed. The chapter will conclude by
showing an example policy and and example encounter with an unequipped intruder.
3.1 Action Space
The current version of TCAS issues advisories to the pilot through an aural annunci-
ation, such as “climb, climb,” and through a visual display. The visual display varies,
but it is typically implemented on a vertical speed indicator, a vertical speed tape,
or a pitch cue on the primary flight display. The set of advisories issued by TCAS
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Table 3.1: Advisory set
Vertical rate (ft/min)
Name Minimum Maximum Strength (g) Available from
COC −∞ ∞ 0 All
DNC −∞ 0 1/4 COC, DES1500, SDES1500, SDES2500, MDES
DND 0 ∞ 1/4 COC, CL1500, SCL1500, SCL2500, MCL
MDES −∞ h˙curr 1/4 COC, DND, CL1500, SCL1500, SCL2500
MCL h˙curr ∞ 1/4 COC, DNC, DES1500, SDES1500, SDES2500
DES1500 −∞ −1500 1/4 COC
CL1500 1500 ∞ 1/4 COC
SDES1500 −∞ −1500 1/3 DNC, DND, MCL, CL1500, SCL1500, SCL2500
SCL1500 1500 ∞ 1/3 DNC, DND, MDES, DES1500, SDES1500, SDES2500
SDES2500 −∞ −2500 1/3 MDES, DES1500, SDES1500
SCL2500 2500 ∞ 1/3 MCL, CL1500, SCL1500
can be interpreted as target vertical rate ranges. If the current vertical rate is outside
the target vertical rate range, the pilot should maneuver to come within the required
range. If the current vertical rate is within the target range, a corrective maneuver
is not required, but the pilot should be careful not to maneuver outside the range.
The set of advisories used by ACAS X is summarized in Table 3.1. In the table,
COC stands for “clear of conflict,” which means that no advisory has been issued
or there is no longer a threat. DNC and DND stand for “do not climb” and “do
not descend,” respectively. The sense of all other advisories are labeled either CL or
DES, for either climb or descend, respectively. The prefix “M” stands for maintain.
The maintain advisories are issued only when the magnitude of the current vertical
rate of the own aircraft (h˙curr) is greater than 1500 ft/min. The maintain advisory
is issued with the current rate as the upper or lower bound on the commanded rate.
The prefix “S” indicates that a stronger response is assumed. Only the minimum and
maximum rates are displayed to the pilot, and not the “strength” of the response,
so the eleven advisories in the table only correspond to nine different advisories to
be displayed to the pilot (including COC). However, it is useful to distinguish the
advisories according to the assumed strength of the maneuver when developing the
MDP model.
Table 3.1 also indicates the availability of each advisory given the current advisory
on display. For example, COC can be issued at any time. However, because DES1500
and CL1500 are initial advisories, they can only be issued if COC is on display to
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the pilot. The advisory SDES1500 can be issued following DND, MCL, CL1500,
SCL1500, and SCL2500, in which case it acts as a reversal, or following DNC, in
which case it acts as a strengthening. Because SDES1500 is a subsequent advisory, it
cannot be issued following COC. It also cannot be issued following DES1500 because
they are fundamentally the same advisory, differing only in strength. The allowed
transitions are modeled after those of TCAS.
The advisories in Table 3.1 are a subset of the advisories available in the current
version of TCAS. Although it captures most of the advisories issued by TCAS, it does
not contain certain rate limit preventive advisories. One advisory that is incorporated
into the set for mulithreat purposes is a multithreat level-off (MTLO). The MTLO
is not included in the action state but is still allowed to be issued, as discussed in
Section 5.3. The computational and storage requirements of the MDP approach scale
linearly with the addition of new actions.
3.2 State Space
The state is represented using five variables:
• h: altitude of the intruder relative to the own aircraft,
• h˙0: vertical rate of the own aircraft,
• h˙1: vertical rate of the intruder aircraft,
• τ : time to potential NMAC, and
• sRA: the state of the resolution advisory.
The state space is discretized using a multidimensional grid. The discretization
used is shown in Table 3.2, which results in approximately 15 million grid vertices
that correspond to discrete states. The discretization can be made finer to improve
the quality of the discrete model approximation, but it would be at the expense of
additional computation and storage. Previous studies involving ACAS X have found
this level of discretization acceptable [42].
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Table 3.2: Discretization scheme
Variable Minimum Maximum Number of values
h −4000 ft 4000 ft 31
h˙0 −10000 ft/min 10000 ft/min 25
h˙1 −10000 ft/min 10000 ft/min 25
τ 0 s 40 s 41
sRA N/A N/A 19
The state variable sRA dictates the state of the resolution advisory. For each ac-
tion besides COC, the aircraft can either be in a responding state or a non-responding
state. The responding and non-responding states for each action allow for a proba-
bilistic pilot response model [42].
3.3 Dynamic Model
The dynamics of the aircraft involved in the encounter are governed by sequences of
accelerations. These accelerations are used to update the vertical rates of the aircraft
and, consequently, their positions. The maximum vertical rate of both aircraft is
assumed to be within ±10,000 ft/min, which is the same as TCAS. The limits can be
adjusted to meet the performance constraints for particular aircraft. The dynamics
are transformed into a discrete state MDP using the multilinear-interpolation and
sigma-point sampling scheme [42].
When pilots are not following a resolution advisory, the aircraft follow a white-
noise acceleration model. At each step, the aircraft selects an acceleration from a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with σh¨ standard deviation. We assume σh¨ = 3 ft/s2, but
this parameter may be estimated from radar data. When the system is in a responding
sRA, it is assumed that the pilot maneuvers with exactly the prescribed acceleration
to come within the target vertical rate range. Once within the target vertical rate
range, the aircraft resumes white-noise vertical accelerations.
For the transition between sRA states, a linear model is used for transitioning
between a non-responding state and a responding state. For example, if a DES1500
advisory is issued, the system has a 1/6 probability of transitioning to the responding
DES1500 sRA and a 5/6 probability of transitioning to a non-responding DES1500
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sRA. Transitions to reversal advisories are modeled the same as the transition for the
initial advisory. Transitions to strengthening or weakening advisories are modeled
with a 1/4 probability of transitioning to a responding sRA. When the advisory is
terminated, the system transitions to the COC sRA with probability 1. Using this
approach, the response to an advisory is a geometric random variable. The success
probability of 1/6 and 1/4 were used so on average the modeled pilot response will
occur in 5 s and 3 s, respectively. These delays come from the ICAO recommended
practices for responding to resolution advisories [1].
3.4 State Estimation
State estimation is performed differently for each variable. The sensor model used
to detect intruder aircraft is based on the current TCAS sensor. The TCAS sensor
measures the slant range and bearing of all nearby intruder aircraft. The slant range
error is modeled as a zero-mean Gaussian with 50 ft standard deviation. The bearing
error is modeled as a zero-mean Gaussian with 10◦ standard deviation. This section
describes how the belief state over each state variable is computed.
• h, h˙0, h˙1. The own aircraft’s vertical state is assumed to be known. In reality,
the ownship’s quantized altitude will be supplied. The quantization will be
relatively small and an accurate vertical state estimate can be made. The
intruder’s vertical state is estimated using a modified Kalman filter designed
for quantized measurements [70], [71]. The intruder’s quantized altitude is
obtained from the intruder’s transponder. The altitude is either quantized by
25 ft or 100 ft.
• τ . A time distribution which factors in horizontal aircraft dynamics is computed
oﬄine using dynamic programming [42]. The dynamic programming uses hor-
izontal range to the intruder, relative horizontal speed, and the difference in
the direction of the relative horizontal velocity and the bearing of the intruder
as states to determine the time distribution. During execution, two unscented
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Kalman filters (UKF) are used to estimate these values. One UKF is used to
estimate the range and range rate of the intruder. The second UKF is used to
estimate the bearing and the cross range rate. These estimates are then used
to look up a distribution over τ from the table generated oﬄine.
• sRA. The belief distribution over sRA is updated recursively using standard
model-based filtering techniques [42]. The belief state over sRA is initialized as
being in the COC state with probability 1. Then at each subsequent time step
t, the belief state is updated as follows:
bt(s′RA) ∝
∑
sRA
p(h˙0t |h˙0t−1, sRA, a)T (sRA, a, s′RA)bt−1(sRA), (3.1)
where p(h˙0t |h˙0t−1, sRA, a) is the probability density of the own aircraft vertical
rate at time t, h˙0t , conditioned on the previously observed vertical rate, h˙0t−1,
the action taken, a, and the previous advisory state, sRA.
3.5 Cost Function
The cost of executing action a from state s is denoted C(s, a) and costs of various
events are summarized in Table 3.3. The costs were chosen after several iterations of
tuning the logic based on operational and safety analysis [72].
Historically, the primary safety metric for evaluating TCAS has been Pr(NMAC),
and so NMACs are assigned high cost. The rewards associated with COC are given
at every time step the system is not alerting to provide some incentive to discontinue
alerting after an encounter has been resolved. The rewards for the advisories DND,
DNC, and maintain provide incentives to issue less aggressive advisories.
If the state space does not require expanding, the computation required to con-
struct the expected cost table grows linearly with the number of cost factors and
the storage required remains constant. Online execution of the logic also remains
constant.
42
Table 3.3: Event costs
Description Cost
NMAC 0.65
Alert for DNC and DND when the vertical closure rate is > 3000 ft/min 0.0005
Alert for advisories other than DNC and DND when the vertical closure rate is > 3000 ft/min 0.0015
Alert for when the vertical closure rate is < 3000 ft/min 0.0023
Corrective advisory 1× 10−5
Reversal 0.008
Strengthening 0.005
Weakening 0.001
Change in h˙ 3× 10−5
Change in h˙ during a crossing 4× 10−4
Corrective advisories when relative altitude is > 650 ft and the vertical closure rate is < 2000 ft/min 0.1
Non-corrective advisories when relative altitude is > 650 ft and the vertical closure rate is < 2000 ft/min 0.01
Corrective advisories when relative altitude is > 1000 ft and the vertical closure rate is < 4000 ft/min 0.03
Maintain advisories < 1500 ft/min 1
Crossing encounters when relative altitude is > 500 ft 0.01
Prohibited advisory transitions 1
Issue COC −1× 10−9
Issue DNC −0.0001
Issue DND −0.0001
Issue a Maintain −0.0004
Preventive advisories during crossing scenarios 1
3.6 Online Costs
The cost function was designed to be based on only the current state and action,
C(s, a). Therefore, any cost that requires “memory” would have to be implemented
by introducing new state variables. Online costs were introduced to penalize actions
in real-time without introducing new state variables. During execution, the expected
costs calculated from the oﬄine optimization are added to the online cost associated
with that action. Table 3.4 summarizes the parameters and costs.
• Altitude Inhibit Cost. The altitude inhibit cost penalizes advisories below cer-
tain altitudes. This online cost was modeled from TCAS and hysteresis is
implemented to prevent chatter. Advisories are prohibited if the aircraft starts
below the upper threshold and remains prohibited until it crosses above that
threshold. From the other direction, advisories are allowed until the aircraft
flies below the lower threshold.
• Advisory Switch Cost. The advisory switch cost penalizes actions that represent
a change from the current advisory within a certain number of seconds after it
is issued. Switching to different advisories such as opposite sense advisories are
penalized differently. This online cost requires memory of the previous advisory
issued and the duration it has been active.
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Table 3.4: Online cost parameters
Description Cost / Value
Altitude Inhibit Cost
All advisories lower hysteresis bound 900 ft
All advisories upper hysteresis bound 1100 ft
All advisories cost ∞
SDES2500, MDES (h˙curr < −2500 ft/min) lower hysteresis bound 1450 ft
SDES2500, MDES (h˙curr < −2500 ft/min) upper hysteresis bound 1650 ft
SDES2500, MDES (h˙curr < −2500 ft/min) cost ∞
DES1500, SDES1500, MDES (h˙curr < −1500 ft/min) lower hysteresis bound 1000 ft
DES1500, SDES1500, MDES (h˙curr < −1500 ft/min) upper hysteresis bound 1200 ft
DES1500, SDES1500, MDES (h˙curr < −1500 ft/min) cost ∞
DNC lower hysteresis bound 1050 ft
DNC upper hysteresis bound 1150 ft
DNC cost 0.005
Advisory Switch Cost
Time the online cost is active after an advisory is issued 10 s
Switch to a reversal 0.05
Switch to COC 0.05
Switch to any advisory except for COC or a reversal 0.025
Advisory Restart Cost
Time the online cost is active after an advisory is terminated 10 s
Restart cost 0.05
Initialization Cost
Time to incur online cost starting from the start of the track 3 s
Initialization cost for all advisories except COC ∞
Forced Cooperation Cost
Slave cost for non-cooperative advisory ∞
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Sensor Measurements
Previous State
Previous Action Issued
State Estimation
Oﬄine Cost Lookup
Online Cost Lookup
+ Find Best Action Best Action
Figure 3-1: Block diagram of ACAS X execution.
• Advisory Restart Cost. The advisory restart cost penalizes advisories when-
ever a prior advisory has been terminated for fewer than a certain number of
processing cycles. This cost requires memory of whether an advisory has been
issued, whether an advisory has terminated, and the amount of time for which
an advisory has been terminated.
• Initialization Cost. The initialization cost prohibits advisories from being issued
for some number of processing cycles. The initialization period allows for the
trackers to stabilize before issuing an advisory.
• Forced Cooperation Cost. The forced cooperation cost penalizes actions that
are incompatible with the sense of an intruder VRC message. This online cost
is the basic implementation of the online forced cooperation scheme discussed
in Section 4.1.2.
3.7 ACAS X Execution
A high level block diagram describing how ACAS X is executed in real-time is shown
in Figure 3-1. Sensor measurements, the previous state estimate, and the previous
action issued are used to calculate the current state estimation. The state estimate is
used to determine the oﬄine costs for the actions. The online costs are also calculated
from the current state estimate along with various other inputs such as the intruder’s
Mode S address. The oﬄine and online costs are summed and the best action is
determined. In a real system, the action is displayed to a pilot for execution and this
process repeats once every second.
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3.8 Optimal Policy
Since the collision avoidance logic is critical to safety, it is important for humans
to understand and anticipate the behavior of the system. Because the logic makes
decisions based on values in an expected cost table, which is not directly informative
to a human, it is necessary to develop ways to visualize the logic. Visualization
is also important in building confidence that the logic produced through computer
optimization is sensible.
The policy plots generated in this thesis are based on simulations with different
initial altitudes. The results are discretized into altitude bins for each time step.
The action for every track at each time step is deposited in its respective bin. The
policy is then represented as the most likely action for each bin. If there is a bin
that no trajectory falls in, no action is displayed. The horizontal axis is time and the
vertical axis is altitude. All simulations were conducted with standard TCAS sensor
uncertainty [1]. The encounters are simulated with no pilot response.
Figure 3-2 shows a policy plot for ACAS X and TCAS. The encounter is between
two aircraft with only the own aircraft equipped. Both aircraft are flying level and
directly at each other horizontally. The time of closest horizontal approach (TCA)
occurs at 40 s. For this scenario, the policies are very similar; however, the ACAS X
alerting region is much smaller than that of TCAS, delaying alerting by about 5 s.
3.9 Example Encounter
Figure 3-3 is an example of an encounter with an unequipped Mode S aircraft that
is not resolved by TCAS. The aircraft have a horizontal time of closest approach
(TCA) of 40 s and the minimum horizontal distance is 438 ft. TCAS predicts adequate
vertical separation until 29 s when it issues a climb advisory. However, the climb
advisory is too late and the encounter results in a vertical separation of 84 ft. ACAS
X issues a DND at 16 s when the own aircraft’s vertical rate is −1500 ft/min and
resolves the encounter with 585 ft of vertical separation.
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Figure 3-2: Policy plot of ACAS X and TCAS against an unequipped intruder. The
intruder starts at 7500 ft and maintains level flight. The own aircraft is also initially
level. TCA occurs at 40 s.
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Figure 3-3: Example of a two aircraft encounter where ACAS X resolves the encounter
and TCAS does not. The intruder is a Mode S unequipped aircraft.
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Chapter 4
Coordination
Much of the development of ACAS X has focused primarily on encounters with a
single unequipped intruder. If the intruder is equipped with a collision avoidance
system, then safety can be significantly improved. However, the maneuvers recom-
mended by the systems must be coordinated. If both the own aircraft and intruder
issue the same advisory, then the likelihood of an NMAC increases. Coordination
of advisories requires communication between aircraft or implicit coordination of the
collision avoidance systems.
When discussing advisories, the terms compatible and coordinated are used inter-
changeably. This section also assumes that the own aircraft is equipped with a CAS
and there is only one intruder that is also equipped with a CAS. Chapter 5 discusses
situations with multiple intruders.
ACAS X must use a communication architecture compatible with TCAS. There-
fore, limited information is shared between collision avoidance systems on different
aircraft. The only shared information is a Vertical Resolution Advisory Complement
(VRC), Cancel Vertical Resolution Advisory Complement (CVC), and Vertical Sense
Bits (VSB). A VRC is transmitted to an intruder when the own aircraft has a res-
olution advisory. The VRC can only be a do not climb or a do not descend
message and corresponds to the opposite sense of the advisory issued. For example,
if TCAS selects a climb advisory against an intruder, the TCAS system sends a mes-
sage to the intruder containing a do not climb VRC. A CVC is sent to cancel the
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previous VRC message. The VSB is used to check consistency with the VRC and
CVC fields before the coordination information is used. Full state information is not
shared and is obtained from noisy sensors on the own aircraft and quantized altitude
measurements from the intruder’s transponder.
The sense of an advisory is determined by the direction of the commanded vertical
rate. Every advisory has a sense of up, down, or none. If an advisory has a
commanded vertical rate that is not bounded in the positive direction only, then its
sense is up. If the vertical rate is not bounded in the negative direction only, then
its sense is down. All other advisories have a sense of none. For example, a DND
would have an up sense while a COC would have a sense of none. Two advisories
are compatible if the senses are different.
With no sharing of state information and a decentralized selection of actions,
Dec-MDPs and Dec-POMDPs provide an appropriate way to model the problem.
However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, optimal solution methods and even approx-
imate solution methods are not computationally tractable. Other methods include
modeling the problem as a MMDP and a forced cooperation scheme similar to what
TCAS uses. Both of these approaches have been previously applied to ACAS X.
Kochenderfer and Chryssanthacopoulos found that the benefit of the added complex-
ity of the MMDP was small and was outperformed by a simpler forced cooperation
scheme [42].
Forced cooperation is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.1. An implicit co-
ordination scheme is explored in Section 4.2 where advisories between two ACAS X
equipped aircraft are guaranteed to issue compatible advisories under perfect state
information. Section 4.3 presents an iterative policy approach that factors in ma-
neuvering intruder dynamics. The remaining sections investigate the interoperability
and robustness of different schemes and the chapter concludes with a summary and
discussion.
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4.1 Forced Cooperation
TCAS uses a forced cooperation scheme, which involves restricting the choice of
advisories to those compatible with the advisory issued by the other aircraft. The
method used on TCAS is quite robust, and no coordination failures are known to
have occurred in TCAS operation (i.e., there has not been a situation where two
coordinated aircraft have issued incompatible advisories). To determine which aircraft
is forced to cooperate, a unique address is used to determine the master aircraft and
slave aircraft. A slave aircraft is forced to issue only compatible advisories with a
master aircraft. The only exception for TCAS is when the slave issues an advisory
first. When a slave aircraft issues an advisory before a master, TCAS limits the
master’s first advisory to only compatible advisories with the slave.
The roles of the aircraft are determined based on the 24 bit ICAO Mode S address
of the aircraft where the aircraft with the lower Mode S address is designated the mas-
ter and the other aircraft is the slave. The aircraft share the sense of their advisories
through the VRC. A forced cooperation scheme can be implemented on ACAS X by
modifying the oﬄine table and updating different modes online, or entirely online by
raising the cost of incompatible advisories.
4.1.1 Oﬄine Approach
Forced cooperation oﬄine requires the addition of a state variable that represents the
advisory sense of the other aircraft. The new state variable is the mode. Since a VRC
is received when an intruder issues an advisory, the sense of the intruder’s advisory
is known, and thus the mode is known. If a VRC was not received, a belief over the
mode could be maintained based on the maneuvers of the intruder aircraft.
For a basic forced cooperation scheme, only three states for the mode are needed:
• mode 0: intruder does not have an advisory or has an advisory with no sense,
• mode 1: intruder has an advisory with an up sense, and
• mode 2: intruder has an advisory with a down sense.
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When the mode is one, all up sense advisories are penalized and when the mode
is two, all down sense advisories are penalized. To simplify the integration of the
mode state variable into the existing ACAS X framework, the dynamics used in
the oﬄine optimization assume that aircraft do not transition between modes. This
implementation does not affect the unequipped performance of the logic.
For basic forced cooperation, the master always remains in mode 0 while the slave
aircraft changes mode based on received VRCs. For unequipped intruders, the own
aircraft would always be in mode zero.
4.1.2 Online Approach
Forced cooperation online does not require any change to the oﬄine table. All penal-
ties are applied online based on received VRCs. For the basic scheme, the master
aircraft never receives an online cost while the slave aircraft receives a cost of infinity
for incompatible advisories. A negative effect of implementing forced cooperation
online is since the oﬄine optimization remains unchanged, the expected costs are
computed assuming that future actions are unimpeded by cooperation restrictions
dictated by another aircraft.
4.1.3 Example Encounter
Figure 4-1 is an example encounter with forced cooperation. Both aircraft are equipped
with ACAS X using a basic forced cooperation scheme. The blue aircraft has the lower
Mode S address and is the master. At 18 s both aircraft have CL1500 as the lowest
cost action. At the next cycle, 19 s, the slave receives a do not climb VRC from
the master. For the online approach, the slave performs the state-action value lookup
as normal and then assigns all up sense advisories a cost of infinity. For the oﬄine
approach, the received VRC means the slave is now in mode one. The slave would
then perform the state-action value lookup with a mode of one. In both cases, the
lowest cost action for the slave at 19 s is DES1500. In this basic implementation,
the master is not affected by received VRCs from the slave.
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Figure 4-1: Example of a two aircraft encounter where both aircraft are equipped
with ACAS X using a forced cooperation scheme.
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4.1.4 Forced Cooperation Improvements
Improvements can be made either oﬄine or online to the basic forced cooperation
scheme. This section describes four ways to consider the collision avoidance problem
and improve upon basic forced cooperation.
Cooperative First Advisory. If the slave issues an advisory before the master, then
it is likely that the slave is maneuvering to comply with its advisory. Reversing the
advisory would lose any benefit from the maneuvering. Performance can be improved
if the master is forced to be compatible with the slave when the slave issues an advisory
first. This improvement can be implemented online by modifying the original online
cost. The same three-mode scheme for the oﬄine optimization could also be used,
but the master aircraft would enter non-zero modes when the slave issues an advisory
first.
Penalty for Master Aircraft. One way to factor in the dynamics of an equipped
intruder is to penalize non-compatible advisories for the master aircraft. Similar to
the cooperative first advisory improvement, when a VRC is received from an intruder,
we can assume that the intruder is maneuvering due to its advisory. This improvement
would result in fewer reversals when the intruder has a resolution advisory, but will
lower the robustness to non-compliant intruders. The penalty for master aircraft
can occur oﬄine with two additional mode states or online with little change to the
original online cost.
Forced Reversals. When two aircraft issue simultaneous advisories, the slave is
forced to change its advisory. The next best action might be COC. An advisory
immediately terminating and then reissuing later with the reversed sense would be
confusing to a pilot. To avoid this scenario a large cost for COC can be added online
when a reversal is forced due to cooperation with a master. This improvement could
be implemented oﬄine as well with no increase in state space size.
Additional Cooperation Costs. The oﬄine dynamics assume an unequipped in-
truder. Not considering the dynamics of an equipped intruder can affect encounters
where the relative altitude between aircraft is small. When coordinated encounters
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occur where the intruder receives an advisory and the relative altitude is small, the
logic can switch advisories before allowing the intruder aircraft to adequately respond.
Penalizing switching from an advisory after a received VRC for a period of time
acts as a delay to allow the intruder to comply with its advisory. After a certain
number of cycles, the own aircraft would have a better estimate of the state of the
intruder. To maintain robustness to non-compliance, reversals to maintain advisories
are penalized along with an exception to reversing due to maneuvering intruders.
Implementing the additional cooperation costs oﬄine would require a very large
increase in the size of the state space. This improvement should be implemented
online. The number of cycles that the same VRC is received along with the intruder’s
vertical rate upon receiving a differing VRC needs to be tracked. The stored vertical
rate is used to aid in detecting significant maneuvers of the intruder in the same sense
as the advisory issued by the own aircraft.
4.1.5 Results
The variations of forced cooperation were simulated on 1.3× 106 equipped vs. equipped
encounters generated from the high fidelity encounter model discussed in Section 1.1.1.
The variations implemented were:
• No Strat: no coordination strategy,
• Basic FC: the basic forced cooperation scheme with no improvements imple-
mented online (same scheme as previously implemented for ACAS X [42]),
• Basic FC Oﬄine: the basic forced cooperation scheme with no improvements
implemented oﬄine,
• FC2: forced cooperation online with the “cooperative first advisory,” “penalty
for master aircraft,” and “forced reversals” improvements implemented online,
• FC2 Oﬄine: forced cooperation oﬄine with the “cooperative first advisory”
and the “penalty for master aircraft” improvements implemented oﬄine and
the “forced reversals” improvement implemented online,
55
Table 4.1: Safety evaluation of forced cooperation coordination schemes
Scheme Risk Ratio Induced RR State Space Size
No Strat 5.33× 10−2 3.13× 10−2 1.51× 107
Basic FC 6.58× 10−3 4.56× 10−3 1.51× 107
Basic FC Oﬄine 6.69× 10−3 4.50× 10−3 4.53× 107
FC2 2.92× 10−3 1.96× 10−3 1.51× 107
FC2 Oﬄine 2.28× 10−3 1.35× 10−3 7.55× 107
Full FC 1.85× 10−3 1.01× 10−3 1.51× 107
Full FC Oﬄine 1.83× 10−3 9.95× 10−4 7.55× 107
• Full FC: forced cooperation online with all improvements implemented online,
and
• Full FC Oﬄine: FC2 Oﬄine with the “forced reversals” and “additional coop-
eration costs” improvements implemented online.
Table 4.1 presents the risk ratio, induced risk ratio, and state space size of the
coordination schemes implemented. The additions to the basic forced cooperation
scheme provide a large improvement in safety. Also, the oﬄine implementation out-
performs the online implementation as expected, except for the basic implementation
which still has improved induced risk ratio performance. The improvement for the
full oﬄine implementation is small and comes with a significant increase in the size
of the state space.
4.2 Implicit Coordination
If collision avoidance systems generate compatible advisories without any form of
communication of action selection, then they are implicitly coordinated. ACAS X,
like TCAS, is not implicitly coordinated with itself. Since altitude rates of the two
aircraft are used instead of the relative altitude rate, the difference in the modeled
dynamics of the aircraft result in a loss of symmetry in the oﬄine table. If the
oﬄine table was symmetric across the encounter, then two ACAS X aircraft would
be implicitly coordinated.
Implicit coordination of the first advisory can be tested for two ACAS X systems
by assuming perfect state information and looking up various state-action values for
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states from opposing perspectives. For example, assume there are two aircraft, A
and B. Aircraft A has an altitude of hA and an altitude rate of h˙A. Aircraft B has
an altitude of hB and an altitude rate of h˙B. Both aircraft would have the same τ
and for determining the first advisory, both aircraft would be in an advisory state of
COC, s1RA. Aircraft A would see the state of the system as (hA − hB, h˙A, h˙B, τ, s1RA)
while aircraft B would see the state as (hB − hA, h˙B, h˙A, τ, s1RA). Performing lookups
across the state space from opposing perspectives finds that ACAS X is not implicitly
coordinated with itself.
Implicit coordination under perfect state information can be guaranteed by taking
advantage of the symmetry of the action and state spaces of ACAS X and manip-
ulating the state-action value lookups. To simplify the manipulation, the maintain
advisory is removed from the action set. The remaining advisories have a distinct
opposite and as a result every advisory state has a corresponding opposite as well.
The opposing actions and advisory states are summarized in Table 4.2.
To guarantee implicit coordination, the lookup of the state-action values for the
master is performed as normal. For the slave, the lookup of the state-action values
is conducted from the opposite perspective and then the values are swapped for
the opposite actions. Therefore, the best action for the master is guaranteed to be
coordinated with the best action for the slave.
This implicit coordination scheme was simulated on 1.3× 106 equipped vs. equipped
encounters generated from the high fidelity encounter model discussed in Section 1.1.1.
The simulations were conducted with noisy TCAS sensors and with no sensor noise
and perfect vertical state information. All simulations were performed with the re-
duced action set. Any simulation with “FC” in the name was simulated with com-
munication of the VRC and all other variations were simulated assuming no com-
munication except for the Mode S address of the aircraft. The schemes simulated
were:
• No Strat NN: no coordination strategy with no sensor noise and perfect vertical
state information,
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Table 4.2: Opposing actions and advisory states
Action / Advisory State Corresponding Opposite
Actions
COC COC
DNC DND
DES1500 CL1500
SDES1500 SCL1500
SDES2500 SCL2500
Advisory States
COC COC
DNC not responding DND not responding
DNC responding DND responding
DES1500 not responding CL1500 not responding
DES1500 responding CL1500 responding
SDES1500 not responding SCL1500 not responding
SDES1500 responding SCL1500 responding
SDES2500 not responding SCL2500 not responding
SDES2500 responding sCL2500 responding
• No Strat: no coordination strategy with noisy TCAS sensors,
• Impl NN: implicit coordination scheme with no sensor noise and perfect vertical
state information,
• Impl: implicit coordination scheme noisy TCAS sensors,
• Impl NN with FC: Impl NN simulation will the full online forced cooperation
scheme discussed in Section 4.1.5,
• Impl with FC: Impl simulation with the full online forced cooperation scheme
discussed in Section 4.1.5,
• FC NN: same as Full FC from Section 4.1.5 with the reduced action set, no
sensor noise, and perfect vertical state information, and
• FC: same as Full FC from Section 4.1.5 with the reduced action set.
The results for the simulations summarized in Table 4.3. The implicit coordina-
tion scheme outperforms no strategy by a factor of 6.5 with no noise; however the
performance of the implicit coordination scheme degrades when sensor noise is intro-
duced. Since the aircraft have different views of the world, implicit coordination can
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no longer be guaranteed. The slave aircraft still determines the state-action values
from the master’s perspective, but must rely on its own state estimation to do so.
The original table lookup with the full forced cooperation scheme outperforms the
implicit coordination method.
The implicit coordination method performs table lookups at false operating points
for the slave. If the table was symmetric, then the FC and Impl with FC simulations
would be very similar. The lookup from the intruder’s perspective, which is not the
appropriate operating point from the oﬄine optimization, is likely the reason there is
a decrease in performance from the FC simulation to the Impl with FC.
Table 4.3: Safety evaluation of a simple implicit coordination scheme
Scheme Risk Ratio Induced RR
No Strat NN 5.63× 10−2 2.57× 10−2
No Strat 5.48× 10−2 3.32× 10−2
Impl NN 8.63× 10−3 4.24× 10−3
Impl 3.48× 10−2 1.91× 10−2
Impl NN with FC 4.07× 10−3 2.69× 10−3
Impl with FC 6.46× 10−3 4.56× 10−3
FC NN 1.95× 10−3 1.10× 10−3
FC 2.52× 10−3 1.64× 10−3
4.3 Iterative Policy Approach
The methods described thus far for coordination on ACAS X have not modeled the
dynamics of an equipped intruder. Assuming an intruder is equipped with a CAS
and the pilot complies with the suggested advisories would reduce robustness to non-
compliant intruders and decrease safety for unequipped intruders. However, modeling
a compliant, equipped intruder has potential to improve performance under normal,
equipped-equipped scenarios. This section presents one way to develop a state-action
value table by modeling an equipped intruder without taking an MMDP or Dec-
POMDP approach. The new table can then be used in conjunction with a forced
cooperation scheme to ensure compatible advisories.
The iterative policy approach (IPA) is similar to Joint Equilibrium-based Search
for Policies (JESP) [73] and was inspired by level-k thinking [74]. With JESP, each
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agent starts with a policy. All but one policy is held fixed while the remaining agent
calculates the best policy in response to the others. Level-k thinking is a model of
strategic behavior where decisions are based on beliefs about what other players will
do.
During the oﬄine optimization, instead of modeling the intruder as unequipped,
the intruder can be modeled as if it was equipped with a variation of ACAS X. To
perform this approach exactly, the state space would have to be expanded to track
the intruder’s sRA. However, an approximate approach can be made by assuming the
sRA of the intruder is always COC and that the intruder immediately responds to an
advisory. To combat the wrongly modeled pilot delay, the acceleration response to
the advisories is reduced by a factor of eight. So, instead of responding with 1/4 g
acceleration after 5 s and 1/3 g acceleration after 3 s, the pilot response is modeled as
an immediate 1/32 g or 1/24 g acceleration.
To determine the best action for the intruder, the state-action values of the in-
truder are found by referencing a previously generated table. The intruder’s view
of the world is determined by transposing the own aircraft’s state to the intruder’s
perspective.
Once a new table is generated, then that table can be used to generate another,
improved table until a local optima is found. This approach was implemented starting
with the original ACAS X table and a total of 7 iterations were performed. Since
the intruder is modeled with equipped dynamics, the cost of an NMAC was increased
to combat a conservative policy. Algorithm 3 is an outline for this approach. The
algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 in that a new, improved policy is generated each
iteration. When calculating the new policy, any policy generation method such as
value iteration or policy iteration can be used.
Figure 4-2 compares policies of the original ACAS X with IPA ACAS X. The
policies were generated with no noise and perfect vertical rate estimation. The in-
truder starts at 7500 ft and maintains level flight. The own aircraft also maintains
level flight. The IPA policy results in a smaller alerting region and a smaller region
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Algorithm 3 IPA Policy Iteration
1: function IPAPolicyIteration(pi0)
2: n← 0
3: N ← maximum number of iterations
4: repeat
5: Assume intruder has policy pin with sRA = COC
6: Calculate pin+1
7: n← n+ 1
8: until pin = pin+1 or n ≥ N
9: return pin+1
of stronger advisories (i.e. CL2500). The IPA policy being more conservative than
the original ACAS X logic is expected due to assuming an equipped intruder.
This IPA table was simulated on 1.3× 106 equipped vs. equipped encounters and
1.5× 106 equipped vs. unequipped encounters generated from the high fidelity en-
counter model discussed in Section 1.1.1. The IPA table was used in conjunction
with the online full forced cooperation scheme. The results of the IPA are presented
in Table 4.4. The results are compared to the online full forced cooperation scheme
with the original ACAS X table. Since the IPA table is different from the original
ACAS X table, the results against Mode S and Mode C intruders are also shown.
Table 4.4: Performance evaluation of the IPA table
Equipped vs. Equipped Equipped vs. Mode S Equipped vs. Mode C
Metrics Original IPA Original IPA Original IPA
RR 1.85× 10−3 1.73× 10−3 1.50× 10−2 1.62× 10−2 2.08× 10−2 2.60× 10−2
Induced RR 1.01× 10−3 8.84× 10−4 7.65× 10−3 9.01× 10−3 1.24× 10−2 1.80× 10−2
Pr(Alert) 2.21× 10−1 2.17× 10−1 2.09× 10−1 2.00× 10−1 2.19× 10−1 2.15× 10−1
Pr(Reversal) 1.10× 10−4 1.80× 10−4 4.52× 10−4 8.87× 10−4 5.03× 10−4 9.09× 10−4
The IPA table results a 6.5% improvement in risk ratio with equipped intrud-
ers, but worse performance against unequipped intruders (8% and 25% for Mode S
and Mode C intruders, respectively). The improvements gained for the equipped-
equipped encounters is small. Also, since the oﬄine dynamics assume a cooperative
equipped intruder, we expect the robustness to non-compliant intruders to decrease.
The robustness is discussed in Section 4.4.
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Figure 4-2: IPA and normal ACAS X policies for a master aircraft in an equipped-
equipped encounter. The intruder starts at 7500 ft and maintains level flight. The
own aircraft is also initially level. TCA occurs at 40 s.
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4.4 Robustness Analysis
Coordinated encounters where an intruder does not respond to an advisory is an
area of concern, especially after the Überlingen mid-air collision in 2002. Of the
coordination strategies discussed, only the iterative approach assumes dynamics of
an equipped aircraft. Therefore, robustness to non-compliant intruders is expected
to be high.
If the own aircraft is the master, then forced cooperation should not be affected by
a non-compliant intruder. However, the “additional cooperation costs” improvement
discussed in Section 4.1.4 does consider the received VRC message. If the intruder
is the master, forced cooperation limits when the own aircraft is allowed to reverse.
The robustness of the full forced cooperation scheme is analyzed in this section and
compared to TCAS.
The simulation setup is similar to the previous simulations except the pilot re-
sponse time was varied. The pilot response was varied for either the master or the
slave, but not at the same time. The normal pilot response of an initial delay of
5 s and all subsequent delays of 3 s was used unless specified. In Table 4.5 the pilot
response column describes the pilot response varied for that simulation. “Normal”
refers to a standard simulation. “None” means the pilot response was turned off for
that particular aircraft and “7 − 5” means the initial delay was set to 7 s and the
subsequent delay was set to 5 s for either the master or slave. The simulations were
conducted using TCAS, and ACAS X. The results are summarized in Table 4.5.
In every scenario, ACAS X with full forced cooperation scheme significantly out-
performed TCAS. When the master aircraft or the slave aircraft still responded to
its advisories but with a delayed response, ACAS X saw a larger percent increase
in risk ratio than TCAS. Yet, ACAS X was safer than TCAS in the same scenar-
ios. As expected, IPA ACAS X degraded in performance and was worse than the
original ACAS X when the intruder had a delayed response or was non-compliant.
This degradation was expected due to assuming an equipped intruder that always
responded to a fixed policy.
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Table 4.5: Safety evaluation of coordination robustness
TCAS IPA ACAS X ACAS X
Pilot Response Risk Ratio Induced RR Risk Ratio Induced RR Risk Ratio Induced RR
Normal 2.54× 10−3 5.40× 10−4 1.73× 10−3 8.84× 10−4 1.85× 10−3 1.01× 10−3
7–5 Master 5.72× 10−3 1.75× 10−3 5.15× 10−3 4.04× 10−3 4.88× 10−3 3.69× 10−3
None Master 5.76× 10−2 2.62× 10−2 2.96× 10−2 1.97× 10−2 2.67× 10−2 1.50× 10−2
7–5 Slave 5.30× 10−3 1.94× 10−3 6.04× 10−3 4.88× 10−3 4.72× 10−3 3.55× 10−3
None Slave 3.98× 10−2 2.34× 10−2 2.42× 10−2 1.53× 10−2 2.19× 10−2 1.13× 10−2
4.5 Interoperability
To test the interoperability of ACAS X with TCAS, two different interoperability
tests were conducted. Both simulations involved one ACAS X equipped aircraft that
used the full forced cooperation scheme implemented online and one TCAS equipped
aircraft. The Mode S addresses were varied to make the ACAS X equipped aircraft
the master and vice versa. The results are summarized in Table 4.6. The master
aircraft is the first aircraft and is referred to as AC 1 in the metrics.
Table 4.6: Performance evaluation of interoperability with standard TCAS sensor
noise
Metrics ACAS X Master TCAS Master Both ACAS Both TCAS
RR 2.59× 10−3 2.09× 10−3 1.85× 10−3 2.54× 10−3
Induced RR 1.52× 10−3 1.05× 10−3 1.01× 10−3 5.40× 10−4
Pr(Alert) 4.89× 10−1 4.87× 10−1 2.21× 10−1 4.99× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 1) 1.70× 10−1 4.71× 10−1 1.94× 10−1 4.72× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 2) 4.73× 10−1 1.72× 10−1 1.97× 10−1 4.73× 10−1
Pr(Reversal) 5.99× 10−4 2.03× 10−3 2.08× 10−3 6.22× 10−3
Pr(Reversal AC 1) 2.30× 10−5 1.11× 10−3 1.10× 10−4 6.92× 10−4
Pr(Reversal AC 2) 5.94× 10−4 1.21× 10−3 1.99× 10−3 6.19× 10−3
Pr(Strengthening) 6.78× 10−3 6.24× 10−3 3.87× 10−3 1.08× 10−2
Pr(Strengthening AC 1) 1.67× 10−3 4.87× 10−3 2.08× 10−3 5.84× 10−3
Pr(Strengthening AC 2) 5.72× 10−3 1.75× 10−3 2.19× 10−3 6.30× 10−3
Since the full forced cooperation scheme implemented in ACAS X is very similar
to that of TCAS, the interoperability of the two collision avoidance systems was not
a concern. The simulation results support that initial hypothesis. The addition of
ACAS X to the encounter either maintains or improves safety. The benefit of an
ACAS X aircraft can be seen from the operational metrics. The probability of alert
of the ACAS X aircraft in each scenario is much lower than the TCAS equipped
aircraft. In addition, the probability of reversing and strengthening also decrease
with the addition of an ACAS X aircraft.
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TCAS does well at not inducing NMACs, but fails to resolve many more en-
counters than ACAS X. As a result, scenarios that involve ACAS X have a large
decrease in unresolved NMACs and have more induced NMACs. The increase in
induced NMACs is a problem that might warrant further investigation despite the
improvement in overall safety.
4.6 Discussion
This chapter presented various approaches to extend ACAS X to handle encounters
with a single intruder equipped with a collision avoidance system. Overall, the IPA
performed best with an equipped intruder, but degraded performance for unequipped
and non-compliant intruders. The full forced cooperation was a rather simple ap-
proach that performed extremely well in safety, operational metrics, and robustness.
The oﬄine method of the full forced cooperation did provide an improvement over
the online method, but required the state space to be expanded by a factor of five.
Due to the simple nature of the online full forced cooperation scheme and the good
performance, it is the best fit for ACAS X. The scheme is suboptimal in general, but
is suitable for ACAS X for several reasons. A variation of this scheme has been
used by TCAS for many years, provides robustness against non-compliant intruders,
and allows for the oﬄine development to be focused on encounters with unequipped
intruders.
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Chapter 5
Multithreat
Multithreat encounters are rare, but they will increase in frequency as the airspace
becomes more dense. During the development of ACAS X, there has been some
research into unequipped multithreat scenarios [42], [75]. For multithreat scenarios
involving equipped intruders, the coordination of advisories is important.
Previous data mining has documented 3803 multithreat encounters over a nine
month period, of which 95% were three aircraft encounters [4]. Most multithreat
situations start as two aircraft encounters and evolve into a three or more aircraft
encounter. Since a majority of actual multithreat encounters involve three aircraft,
the multithreat logic for ACAS X must perform well with two intruder scenarios.
However, all the approaches for three aircraft encounters should extend easily to an
arbitrary number of intruders.
This chapter discusses the challenges with multiple unequipped and equipped in-
truders. First, we will discuss the problem in general and review potential solution
methods. Then we will provide more detail on cost fusion techniques and apply this
approach to ACAS X. The addition of an action specifically for multithreat encoun-
ters will be discussed. Finally, the section will end with results from simulations of
ACAS X on realistic encounters from a high fidelity encounter model along with some
stress testing results.
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5.1 Potential Solution Methods
As discussed in Chapter 4, an appropriate way to model the problem would be as
a Dec-MDP or a Dec-POMDP. However, the solution methods are computationally
intractable. Also, as the number of aircraft increases, the computation required to
generate a policy would also increase. Therefore, we need to consider methods that
scale well to an arbitrary number of intruders.
TCAS treats each threat individually, with the same threat detection, initial sense
selection, and initial strength selection logic that would be used with a single intruder.
The multithreat portion of the logic attempts to reconcile the senses and strengths
associated with each intruder before displaying a composite advisory to the pilots.
When all threats have the same sense, the logic simply uses the individual advisory
with the greatest strength. When the senses of the individual advisories differ, TCAS
uses a set of rules to either (1) identify a single sense for all threats or (2) issue a
“dual-negative advisory” that places vertical rate limits in both directions.
A similar approach could be used for ACAS X. However a large benefit of ACAS X
over TCAS is the ability to accommodate the anticipated evolution of the airspace
and re-optimize the logic as necessary with little development effort. Due to the
complexity of the pseudocode with TCAS, it is difficult to modify the logic. If a
command arbitration approach was used for ACAS X to handle multithreat scenarios,
the ease of interchanging new logic tables might be lost. A specific example would
be if a different action set is used. A command arbitration approach would likely
result in advisory specific rules. Therefore, changing an advisory set will result in an
overhaul of the multithreat logic.
The next section explains an alternative method where costs associated with in-
dividual intruders are fused.
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5.2 Cost Fusion
An n-aircraft multithreat scenario can be separated into n single threat encounters.
The single threat logic of ACAS X can be executed as a sub-agent for each individual
threat. The outputs from the n single threat encounters could either be actions or
state-action values. Research has shown that utilizing state-action values from sub-
agents of a complex system can result in better performance than trying to fuse or
arbitrate over suggested actions from the sub-agents [76], [77]. The process of using
state-action values from sub-agents solving a portion of the problem is called cost
fusion.
Cost fusion computes the state-action costs C∗(s, a) for all actions a by using the
state-action costs for intruder i, C∗(si, a), assuming intruder i is the only threat. The
state-action costs from multiple intruders are fused to arrive at the global state-action
cost function C∗(s, a). Fusing the costs requires defining a function f that combines
costs associated with multiple intruders. That is,
C∗(s, a) = f(C∗(s1, a), . . . , C∗(sN , a)), (5.1)
where N is the number of intruders. After fusing the utilities, the optimal action is
computed using
pi∗(s) = arg minaC∗(s, a). (5.2)
The fusion of the costs occurs after the online and oﬄine costs are combined. There-
fore, C∗(si, a) represents the sum of the oﬄine and online costs of taking action a for
intruder i alone. Previous work on ACAS X assumed that C∗(si, a) represented just
the oﬄine cost of taking action a for intruder i alone.
Two utility fusion methods were studied for the multithreat logic. The first
method, the min-sum strategy, defines f to be a summation:
C∗(s, a) =
∑
i
C∗(si, a). (5.3)
Defining f in this way leads to counting penalties such as alert costs and reversal costs
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Table 5.1: Costs for a two-intruder example
Intruder No alert Climb Descend
1 13 11 7
2 15 0 8
sum 28 11 15
max 15 11 8
multiple times. The cost of alerting, for example, would be reflected in the state-
action costs for each intruder. Adding these utilities together amounts to incurring
the alert cost multiple times, though in reality the collision avoidance system can only
alert once at any given time. This may cause the system to delay issuing the alert.
Delaying an alert can be undesirable because there may be fewer available options to
resolve the conflict further into the encounter. When more intruders are present, the
importance of alerting earlier is magnified.
The second method, the min-max strategy, avoids accumulating penalties for each
intruder by defining f as follows:
C∗(s, a) = max
i
C∗(si, a). (5.4)
Table 5.1 is an example contrived to illustrate the difference between the two
methods. There are two intruders and three actions (no alert, climb, and descend)
from which to select at the current time. The table shows the cost for each intruder
and for each action. The min-sum method issues the climb advisory because it is
effective in preventing conflict with the second intruder (hence the low cost), even
though following the climb may lead to conflict with the first intruder. The min-max
method selects the descend action because the higher cost for executing the descend
is 8 while the highest cost for executing the climb is 11.
One property of the cost fusion methods is that they do not alert any earlier than
the single-threat policy on which they are built. This may be undesirable because it
may be necessary to alert a little earlier to pass above or below all intruders.
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Theorem 1. If the optimal action for each intruder pi∗(s1), . . . , pi∗(sN) is COC, then
the min-sum and min-max decomposition methods will also have an optimal action of
COC.
Proof. Since pi∗(si) = COC, then for all intruders i,
C∗(si,COC) ≤ C∗(si, a),∀a. (5.5)
• Min-Sum
Equation (5.5) implies
C∗(s,COC) =
∑
i
C∗(si,COC) ≤
∑
i
C∗(si, a) = C∗(s, a), ∀a. (5.6)
Therefore, pi∗(s) = arg minaC∗(s, a) = COC.
• Min-Max
The proof will be by contradiction. From the theorem statement, Eq. (5.5) still
holds. Now, we will assume, with out loss of generality, that
pi∗(s) = a˜ 6= COC. (5.7)
Therefore, C∗(s, a˜) < arg maxiC∗(si,COC). Based on the definition of f for the
min-max method, we know that there exists an intruder k such that C∗(s, a˜) =
C∗(sk, a˜). From Eq. (5.5) we know
C∗(sk,COC) < C∗(sk, a˜). (5.8)
Thus, C∗(s, a˜) < arg maxiC∗(si,COC) for all intruders such that i 6= k. With
out lost of generality, assume that C∗(sj,COC) = arg maxiC∗(si,COC). From
Eq. (5.8), we know that j 6= k.
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By Eq. (5.7), the definition of f , and Eq. (5.5),
C∗(sk, a˜) > C∗(sj, a˜) > C∗(sj,COC). (5.9)
However, we said that
C∗(sk, a˜) = C∗(s, a˜) < arg max
i
C∗(si,COC) = C∗(sj,COC), (5.10)
which gives us a contradiction.
Figure 5-1 shows the policies for the min-max and min-sum fusion methods. The
intruders are at 7300 ft and 7700 ft and fly level. The horizontal geometry is head-on
and TCA for both intruders is at 40 s. The own aircraft is initially level. As expected,
double-counting costs makes the alerting region for the min-sum method smaller. The
alerting region for the min-max method is similar to the individual policies, but still
varies. The min-max method delays alerting a little longer when compared to the
individual policies, especially when the own aircraft is between the intruders.
One problem with cost fusion techniques is the influence of non-critical agents on
decisions. For example, suppose a second intruder enters an encounter, but is far away
and does not pose a threat. The third aircraft is not a concern; however, fusing the
costs of that intruder, despite it not being a factor, affects the action selection process.
To mitigate the problem of non-threatening aircraft impacting the alert behavior, a
form of arbitration is incorporated in which the costs of an intruder are only considered
if the own aircraft would alert against that intruder in isolation. This process allows
the cost fusion to alert at the same time as it would in an individual encounter. This
arbitration is different than what was previously proposed for ACAS X [42].
Figure 5-2 shows an example of the two fusion strategies with this type of arbi-
tration. Once arbitration is introduced, the policies between the two fusion schemes
become very similar. The geometry of the encounter is the same as presented in Fig-
ure 5-1. Because the fusion scheme is only used when both aircraft are threats, there
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Figure 5-1: Policy plot using the min-sum and min-max cost fusion schemes. The
intruders start at 7300 ft and 7700 ft and fly level. The horizontal geometry is head-
on and both intruders’ horizontal TCA to the own aircraft occur at 40 s. The own
aircraft is initially in level flight.
73
is a delay when the own aircraft is in the middle. This affect can be easily identified
when the intruders are separated by a greater altitude.
5.3 Multithreat Level-Offs
The single threat advisory set does not contain any dual-negative advisories that
place speed limits in both senses. TCAS uses a variety of these advisories to resolve
multithreat encounters. An example of a dual-negative advisory is a multithreat level-
off (MTLO). An MTLO advisory limits the up sense to a maximum vertical rate of
250 ft/min and limits the down sense to a minimum vertical rate of −250 ft/min. An
MTLO is often appropriate in sandwich encounters, where there are threats both
above and below. A sandwich encounter often results in an up sense being issued
against one intruder and a down sense against another. Often a single sense advisory
is inadequate, and so an MTLO is issued, allowing the aircraft to pass between the
two intruders.
An MTLO could be added to the advisory set, but then the logic could issue an
MTLO during single intruder encounters, which is undesirable. We can determine
when an MTLO should be issued based on a series of general, simple checks. When
discussing the checks, the best action for each intruder when the intruder is considered
in isolation is used and are refered to as individual actions. A total of three checks is
used to determine when an MTLO should be issued for ACAS X.
Conflicting Actions. The first and possibly most obvious check, is that there has
to be a minimum of two individual actions of opposite senses. For example, a CL1500
against intruder one and a DES1500 against intruder 2.
Conflicting VRCs. If an aircraft is receiving two or more conflicting VRCs and
is forced to coordinate with the other aircraft, then an MTLO should be issued. For
example, consider a three aircraft encounter where aircraft A has the lowest Mode
S address, aircraft B has the second lowest Mode S address, and aircraft C has the
highest Mode S address. If aircraft A has an up sense advisory against aircraft C, and
aircraft B has a down sense advisory against aircraft C, then aircraft C is receiving do
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Figure 5-2: Policy plot using the min-sum and min-max cost fusion schemes with
arbitration. The intruders start at 7300 ft and 7700 ft and fly level. The horizontal
geometry is head-on and both intruders’ horizontal TCA to the own aircraft occur at
40 s. The own aircraft is initially in level flight.
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not climb and do not descend VRCs from two master aircraft. Since pairwise
coordination is required (using forced cooperation), the only logical choice is to issue
an MTLO.
MTLOs with Unequipped Intruders. A situation where an MTLO is undesirable
involves unequipped intruders. If an MTLO is issued when an unequipped intruder is
within the vertical separation for an NMAC, then the own aircraft will fly level into a
conflict. Prohibiting an MTLO within a vertical threshold of an unequipped intruder
when the aircraft are not diverging at an acceptable rate ensures that separation will
increase before an MTLO is issued.
Figure 5-3 shows an encounter where the prevention of an MTLO due to an
unequipped intruder is helpful. In this example, an MTLO is prohibited if the aircraft
is within 150 ft vertically of an unequipped intruder and the aircraft are not diverging
by more than 250 ft/min. The intruders do not have enough separation at TCA to
allow the own aircraft to split the two intruders. If the intruders were equipped with a
CAS, then an MTLO could be issued because aircraft B would be expected to climb
while aircraft C would be expected to descend. Since neither aircraft is equipped,
then an MTLO should not be allowed. Not allowing the MTLO and keeping the
descend advisory due to the unequipped check results in adequate separation and
resolves the encounter.
Figure 5-4 shows an example policy of the complete ACAS X multithreat logic
with the min-max strategy compared to a TCAS policy. Both of the policies were
computed with no noise. The encounter geometries are the same as in Figure 5-1 and
Figure 5-2. There are distinct differences in the ACAS X and TCAS policies. The
most noticeable is the appearance that TCAS basically treats the two intruders as a
single aircraft with a larger protection zone. The avoidance of sandwich encounters is
very common with the TCAS multithreat logic. This tendency works well with two
intruders, but tends to degrade performance when more intruders are introduced.
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Figure 5-4: Policy plot of ACAS X using the min-max with arbitration and MTLOs
method compared to TCAS. The intruders start at 7300 ft and 7700 ft and fly level.
The horizontal geometry is head-on and both intruders’ horizontal TCA to the own
aircraft occur at 40 s. The own aircraft is initially in level flight.
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5.4 Resolution Advisory State
The belief distribution over sRA must always be updated based on the global action.
Maintaining different beliefs over sRA for each intruder could result in selecting inap-
propriate advisories. All sRA updates occur with the global actions except when an
MTLO is issued. If an MTLO is issued, the sRA is updated with a DNC if the own
vertical rate is greater than or equal to zero and DND if the own vertical rate is less
than to zero.
Treating sRA globally has some important consequences in multithreat situations.
Suppose, for example, there are two intruders. The own aircraft alerts due to the
first intruder. The second intruder is close, but is not considered a threat. Since
sRA is global, there is no longer a cost for alerting against the second intruder, which
can result in premature alerting against the second intruder. However, this negative
affect is relatively small.
5.5 Online Costs
The various online costs depend upon the previous advisory issued (see Section 3.6).
In multithreat situations, each intruder is treated as if it were in isolation. If the
intruder is not a threat, then the online costs are updated as if a clear of conflict was
issued. If the best action globally is an MTLO and the intruder is a threat, then the
online costs associated with that intruder are updated with either a DNC or DND,
depending on the sense of the individual advisory. Otherwise, they are updated with
the global action.
5.6 Multithreat Coordination
The communication between aircraft in a multithreat encounter is still limited to the
VRC, VSB, CVC, and the Mode S address. Therefore, coordination must be done
pairwise. A non-zero VRC will only be sent to an intruder if the individual advisory
is an alert. For example, if the own aircraft issues a climb with respect to intruder A
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and a COC with respect to B, then a do not climb VRC would be sent to A and no
message would be sent to B.
If an MTLO is issued by the own aircraft, then different coordination messages
are sent to the intruders. The coordination message sent to each intruder is based on
the individual advisories toward those intruders considered in isolation. All intruders
in which an up sense was desired would be sent a do not climb and all intruders in
which a down sense was desired would be sent a do not descend VRC. If there was no
advisory toward a particular intruder, then no message would be sent.
From a high level perspective, ACAS X does not differ greatly from TCAS in how
it handles multithreat encounters. Both handle coordination in a pairwise manner
and use single threat logic to resolve encounters individually, fusing those results to
determine a global action. The fundamental differences are in the fusion process.
However, those differences do not affect interoperability. Section 5.8.4 will discuss
interoperability simulation results.
5.7 ACAS X Multithreat Execution
Figure 5-5 is a detailed block diagram on how ACAS X execution occurs with multiple
intruders. A belief state and a set of online costs are kept separate for each intruder.
The updates for the belief state and the online costs are determined from the outputs
from the “Action Selection” component (i.e. individual actions and advisory).
The cost fusion and MTLO determination occurs in the “Action Selection” com-
ponent. The summed action costs (online and oﬄine) for each intruder are needed for
this determination. From this diagram, we can see that the computational complexity
for selecting an action at each cycle increases linearly with the number of intruders.
A plot of mean execution times to select an action is shown in Figure 5-6. The
times were determined using the Min-Max with arbitration and MTLO fusion scheme.
The timing included the “Individual Cost Estimation” and “Action Selection” com-
ponents of Figure 5-5. Figure 5-6 validates that the complexity increases linearly with
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Figure 5-6: Mean execution time for ACAS X action selection for each cycle.
the number of intruders. The simulations were conducted on a single core of an
Intel Xeon CPU operating at 3.33GHz.
5.8 Simulation
Simulations were conducted using three-aircraft encounters generated from a high-
fidelity model [4]. Two variations of stress test encounters were also used. In both
stress test sets, the intruders are initially distributed (with some variance) around the
first aircraft so that all aircraft will converge at the center in 40 s. For the first stress
testing encounter set, there were no accelerations applied to the aircraft. For the
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Table 5.2: Stress testing encounter set model parameters
Parameters Stress Test Set 1 Stress Test Set 2
Number of encounters 1× 105 1× 105
Initial vertical rate (ft/min) Uniform (−1000, 1000) Uniform (−1000, 1000)
Vertical acceleration noise (ft/s2) None Normal (0, 3)
Initial speed (kt) Uniform (150, 450) Uniform (150, 450)
Horizontal acceleration noise (ft/s2) None Normal (0, 6)
second set, the accelerations of the aircraft were white Gaussian noise sampled every
second. The parameters of the two stress testing sets are summarized in Table 5.2.
These models are not very realistic, but they provide a way to stress test the system
to ensure proper behavior with an arbitrary number of intruders. An example of a
stress testing encounter from both sets with 5 aircraft is shown in Figure 5-7.
If the encounter only involves one equipped aircraft, then the risk ratio is cal-
culated with that aircraft. Since a CAS cannot affect the other two aircraft, only
the equipped aircraft is considered when computing the NMAC rate. For ease of
presenting the results, a three letter sequence will be used to signify the equipage of
the aircraft involved. The aircraft listed first would have the lowest Mode S address
and the aircraft listed last would have the highest Mode S address. For example, the
sequence “XTS” signifies a three aircraft encounter of a master ACAS X aircraft, a
slave TCAS aircraft and an unequipped aircraft with a Mode S transponder.
5.8.1 ACAS X vs. Two Unequipped Intruders
Table 5.3 summarizes the simulation results for scenarios where there were two un-
equipped intruders. “XSS Max” refers to the min-max fusion technique, while “XSS
Sum” refers to the min-sum method. The min-max method outperforms the min-sum
method for safety and alert rate and both methods outperform TCAS. The ACAS X
min-max method reduces the risk ratio by 22% while alerting 34% less compared to
TCAS.
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Figure 5-7: Example of a five aircraft stress testing encounter. Left encounter is from
stress test set 1 and right encounter is from stress test 2.
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Table 5.3: Performance evaluation with two unequipped intruders
Metrics XSS Max XSS Sum TSS
RR 9.34× 10−2 9.41× 10−2 1.20× 10−1
Induced RR 1.43× 10−2 1.45× 10−2 1.71× 10−2
Pr(Alert) 4.33× 10−1 4.33× 10−1 6.55× 10−1
Pr(Reversal) 3.03× 10−3 1.90× 10−3 1.24× 10−2
Pr(Strengthening) 2.97× 10−2 2.18× 10−2 6.20× 10−2
5.8.2 Two Equipped Aircraft and One Unequipped
Table 5.4 summarizes the simulation results for scenarios where two aircraft were
equipped with ACAS X and there was a Mode S unequipped intruder. Both methods
for ACAS X outperform TCAS in every category except for the Pr(Induced NMAC).
A large portion of the induced NMACs occur when an advisory is issued due to the
other equipped aircraft and causes a maneuver toward the unequipped aircraft. Often
an MTLO is issued which would resolve the encounter if the aircraft was equipped,
but because it is not, the aircraft continue on their paths and result in an NMAC.
The min-max method reduced the risk ratio by 11%. The safety improvement of
was achieved with a 27% reduction in alerts, 82% reduction in reversals, and a 48%
reduction in strengthenings compared to TCAS.
Table 5.4: Performance evaluation with two equipped aircraft and one unequipped
intruder
Metrics XXS Max XXS Sum TTS
RR 1.01× 10−1 1.01× 10−1 1.13× 10−1
Induced RR 1.50× 10−2 1.48× 10−2 1.26× 10−2
Pr(Alert) 5.88× 10−1 5.88× 10−1 8.03× 10−1
Pr(Reversal) 2.22× 10−3 2.13× 10−3 1.22× 10−2
Pr(Strengthening) 4.48× 10−2 3.38× 10−2 8.65× 10−2
5.8.3 Three Equipped Aircraft
Table 5.5 summarizes the simulation results for scenarios with three ACAS X air-
craft. ACAS X outperforms TCAS in every metric and the min-max fusion method
outperforms the min-sum method in the safety metrics. The min-max fusion method
resulted in a reduction in Risk Ratio over TCAS by 8% and a reduction in induced
NMACs by 53%. The improvements to the operational metrics by ACAS X was more
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significant with a reduction in alerts by 26%, a reduction in reversals by 66%, and a
reduction in strengthenings by 18% compared to TCAS.
Table 5.5: Performance evaluation with three equipped aircraft
Metrics XXX Max XXX Sum TTT
RR 8.22× 10−2 8.23× 10−2 8.92× 10−2
Induced RR 1.72× 10−3 1.82× 10−3 3.68× 10−3
Pr(Alert) 6.09× 10−1 6.09× 10−1 8.28× 10−1
Pr(Reversal) 2.99× 10−3 2.95× 10−3 8.86× 10−3
Pr(Strengthening) 5.46× 10−2 4.46× 10−2 6.68× 10−2
5.8.4 Interoperability
Interoperability was tested in both two and three aircraft scenarios by permuting the
master-slave relationship among the aircraft. The results for the two equipped aircraft
scenarios are summarized in Table 5.6, and the three equipped aircraft scenario results
are presented in Table 5.7. All simulations used the min-max fusion method on
ACAS X.
Similar to the results of Section 5.8.2, introducing an ACAS X equipped air-
craft increases safety and outperforms TCAS in all operational metrics. However, it
increases the Pr(Induced NMAC) slightly over the TTS scenario, but reduces it com-
pared to the XXS scenario. Examining the Pr(NMAC) for each equipped aircraft in
the individual scenarios shows that the ACAS X aircraft is always safer than a TCAS
equipped aircraft while alerting much less. For the three equipped interoperability
scenarios, the introduction of an ACAS X aircraft improves the overall safety. Safety
is improved as more ACAS X aircraft are involved in the encounter.
Table 5.6: Performance evaluation of interoperability with two equipped aircraft and
one unequipped intruder
Metrics XTS TXS XXS TTS
RR 1.03× 10−1 1.10× 10−1 1.01× 10−1 1.13× 10−1
Induced RR 1.22× 10−2 1.48× 10−2 1.50× 10−2 1.26× 10−2
Pr(NMAC AC 1) 9.87× 10−4 1.14× 10−3 9.96× 10−4 1.12× 10−3
Pr(NMAC AC 2) 1.04× 10−3 1.02× 10−3 9.82× 10−4 1.07× 10−3
Pr(Alert) 7.52× 10−1 7.54× 10−1 5.88× 10−1 8.03× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 1) 4.18× 10−1 6.67× 10−1 4.41× 10−1 6.69× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 2) 6.63× 10−1 4.15× 10−1 4.39× 10−1 6.66× 10−1
Pr(Strengthening) 6.68× 10−2 6.58× 10−2 4.48× 10−2 8.65× 10−2
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Table 5.7: Performance evaluation of interoperability with three equipped aircraft
Metrics XXT XTX TXX XTT TXT TTX XXX TTT
RR 8.60× 10−2 8.74× 10−2 8.44× 10−2 8.73× 10−2 8.69× 10−2 8.84× 10−2 8.22× 10−2 8.92× 10−2
Induced RR 5.18× 10−3 6.50× 10−3 3.25× 10−3 4.95× 10−3 4.39× 10−3 5.96× 10−3 1.72× 10−3 3.68× 10−3
Pr(NMAC AC 1) 8.66× 10−4 8.64× 10−4 8.62× 10−4 8.65× 10−4 8.79× 10−4 8.73× 10−4 8.29× 10−4 8.91× 10−4
Pr(NMAC AC 2) 8.42× 10−4 9.01× 10−4 8.41× 10−4 8.87× 10−4 8.63× 10−4 9.02× 10−4 8.22× 10−4 8.96× 10−4
Pr(NMAC AC 3) 8.86× 10−4 8.70× 10−4 8.42× 10−4 8.79× 10−4 8.79× 10−4 8.91× 10−4 8.27× 10−4 9.03× 10−4
Pr(Alert) 7.75× 10−1 7.75× 10−1 7.75× 10−1 8.28× 10−1 8.29× 10−1 8.28× 10−1 6.09× 10−1 8.28× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 1) 4.26× 10−1 4.25× 10−1 6.76× 10−1 4.03× 10−1 6.79× 10−1 6.78× 10−1 4.49× 10−1 6.83× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 2) 4.26× 10−1 6.75× 10−1 4.25× 10−1 6.78× 10−1 4.04× 10−1 6.77× 10−1 4.48× 10−1 6.82× 10−1
Pr(Alert AC 3) 6.75× 10−1 4.25× 10−1 4.25× 10−1 6.79× 10−1 6.78× 10−1 4.03× 10−1 4.48× 10−1 6.83× 10−1
Pr(Strengthening) 6.19× 10−2 6.06× 10−2 5.94× 10−2 6.69× 10−2 6.54× 10−2 6.50× 10−2 5.46× 10−2 6.68× 10−2
5.8.5 Stress Testing
Scenarios were generated that included 3 to 10 aircraft. As the number of aircraft in-
creases, the computation scales linearly. For the stress testing, the aircraft were either
all equipped with ACAS X or all equipped with TCAS. The ACAS X aircraft used
the min-max fusion method. An example of a resolved encounter where all aircraft
are equipped with ACAS X from stress test 1 is shown in Figure 5-8. The nominal
vertical profile is shown on the left, while the vertical tracks with ACAS X equipped
aircraft is on the right. For this encounter, ACAS X was able to successfully resolve
the situation so no aircraft resulted in a NMAC. The minimum vertical distance be-
tween any aircraft at TCA is 248 ft. The advisories for each aircraft are omitted to
avoid clutter.
Figure 5-9 summarizes the results of stress testing ACAS X compared against
TCAS. ACAS X significantly outperforms TCAS for encounters involving more than
3 aircraft. For stress test set 2, the encounters are not guaranteed to have an n-aircraft
conflict at TCA due to the white noise accelerations. ACAS X is able to resolve these
encounters considerably better than TCAS.
5.9 Discussion
This chapter explored options for expanding the ACAS X logic to multiple intruders.
The result was improved performance over TCAS in almost all metrics evaluated.
ACAS X outperformed TCAS in all metrics for every scenario.
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Figure 5-8: Example of a resolved five aircraft stress testing encounter by ACAS X.
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Figure 5-9: Risk ratio vs. number of intruders for both stress testing encounter sets.
Sandwich encounters are particularly challenging to resolve. The costs cannot be
fused to gain an earlier alert in multithreat situations. A potential solution to the
current cost fusion approach could be to reward alerting once multiple intruders reach
a certain threshold. However, the current method still outperforms TCAS on realistic
scenarios derived from an encounter model. In addition, stressing the logic showed a
large increase in safety over TCAS and promising results for difficult encounters.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
The next generation air traffic collision avoidance system, ACAS X, was originally
designed for single unequipped intruders. This thesis investigated different methods
to extend ACAS X to coordinated encounters and multiple equipped intruders. The
research was broken up into two separate parts—coordination and multithreat.
Various methods were explored for coordinated encounters involving two equipped
aircraft. An iterative policy approach resulted in the best performance for equipped
encounters, but degraded safety in unequipped scenarios. A forced cooperation
scheme was implemented both oﬄine and online. The oﬄine approach outperformed
the online approach, but required a large increase in state space size. Overall, the
online forced cooperation scheme is a simple approach, performed better than TCAS,
integrates well with TCAS aircraft, and provides robustness to non-compliant intrud-
ers.
To extend ACAS X to handle multiple intruders, cost fusion was explored with two
different fusion methods. The cost fusion approach was modified to only fuse costs
of intruders that were threats when considered in isolation. A multithreat specific
action, an MTLO, was also added as an option for ACAS X. An MTLO is issued
if a series of general, simple checks are passed. The Min-Max scheme with MTLOs
performed well and outperformed TCAS.
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The multithreat logic computation scales linearly with the number of intruders.
This scalability enabled us to stress test the coordination and multithreat logic on
scenarios involving up to ten intruders. The logic significantly outperformed TCAS
with four or more intruders.
6.2 Further Work
The suggested online full forced cooperation scheme performs well, yet has a higher
induced NMAC rate than TCAS. In addition, the induced NMAC rate for the two
equipped multithreat scenarios was also higher than that of TCAS. Induced NMACs
are viewed worse than unresolved NMACs by the community. Therefore, despite the
improved overall safety, further studies into reducing the induced NMAC is needed.
The focus of this thesis was to develop safe and operationally acceptable coordi-
nation and multithreat strategies for ACAS X. During this process, a goal was to not
increase the size of the state space. Further work exploring the benefits of expanding
the state space should be conducted.
Expanding the state space to include multiple modes for equipped and unequipped
intruders is a potential path. However, this approach would require the state space
to at least double. In addition, expanding the state space to handle more intruders
should be explored. As technology progresses, the storage capacity for the oﬄine
table will only increase, enabling a larger state space.
Another area to explore for coordination is generalizing the forced cooperation ap-
proach to maneuvers not in the vertical plane. Restricting the scope of actions to the
vertical plane makes it easy to label cooperative and non-cooperative advisories. The
forced cooperation scheme can work in more complex domains; however, cooperative
and non-cooperative advisories would have to be defined.
The multithreat logic can be further explored in many ways. First, a more princi-
pled way of issuing an MTLO should be investigated. Simple, general checks provide
a quick and easy way to implement multithreat specific advisories; however, other ap-
proaches that take advantage of the oﬄine optimization more might perform better.
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Another area to investigate with the multithreat logic is a possible real time solution
method once encounters enter a multithreat situation. This would not require an
addition to the state space, but would add more computation per action selection.
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